Secrecy and Society

ISSN: 2377-6188

Volume 2
Number 1 Secrecy and Intelligence

Article 2

September 2018

Secrets and Lies — Exposed and Combatted: Warrantless
Surveillance Under and Around the Law 2001-2017
Patrice McDermott

Government Information Watch, pmcdermott@govinfowatch.net

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/secrecyandsociety
Part of the Other Political Science Commons

Recommended Citation
McDermott, Patrice. 2018. "Secrets and Lies — Exposed and Combatted: Warrantless
Surveillance Under and Around the Law 2001-2017." Secrecy and Society 2(1).
https://doi.org/10.31979/2377-6188.2018.020102 https://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/
secrecyandsociety/vol2/iss1/2

This Special Issue Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of
Information at SJSU ScholarWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Secrecy and
Society by an authorized administrator of SJSU ScholarWorks. For more information,
please contact scholarworks@sjsu.edu.
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.

Secrets and Lies — Exposed and Combatted: Warrantless
Surveillance Under and Around the Law 2001-2017
Abstract
Before June 2013, civil society and much of Congress were largely in the dark about the
extent of the surveillance activities of the National Security Agency and the
circumlocutions of statute undertaken by the White House and the Department of Justice.
After the releases by Edward Snowden to specific journalists, the mendacity of Intelligence
Community lawyers and leaders, the evasions of the law and manipulation of the FISA
Court by the White House working with the Justice Department, and the scope of the
violations of the Fourth Amendment protections of U.S. Persons (USPs) became
increasingly apparent.2 This article reviews the changes that were initiated in the
Executive Branch (and to a lesser extent in the Legislative Branch), the role civil society
played in pushing and utilizing greater transparency, and what the changes mean for
government accountability to the public.

Keywords
congressional oversight, Executive Order 12333, FISA, FISC, Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, Michael Hayden, Intelligence
Community, National Security Agency, national security intelligence, NSA, President’s
Surveillance Program, Edward Snowden, U.S. Department of Justice, warrantless
surveillance

This special issue article is available in Secrecy and Society: https://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/
secrecyandsociety/vol2/iss1/2

McDermott: Secrets and Lies — Exposed and Combatted

Secrets and Lies - Exposed and Combatted: Warrantless Surveillance
Under and Around the Law, 2001–2017
Patrice McDermott1

Abstract
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Agency and the circumlocutions of statute undertaken by the White House
and the Department of Justice. After the releases by Edward Snowden to
specific journalists, the mendacity of Intelligence Community lawyers and
leaders, the evasions of the law and manipulation of the FISA Court by the
White House working with the Justice Department, and the scope of the
violations of the Fourth Amendment protections of U.S. Persons (USPs)
became increasingly apparent.2 This article reviews the changes that were
initiated in the Executive Branch (and to a lesser extent in the Legislative
Branch), the role civil society played in pushing and utilizing greater
transparency, and what the changes mean for government accountability to
the public.
Keywords congressional oversight, Executive Order 12333, FISA, FISC,
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court,
Michael Hayden, Intelligence Community, National Security Agency, national
security intelligence, NSA, President’s Surveillance Program, Edward
Snowden, U.S. Department of Justice, warrantless surveillance

Published by SJSU ScholarWorks, 2018

1

Secrecy and Society, Vol. 2, No. 1 [2018], Art. 2

Do you think a program of this magnitude gathering information
involving a large number of people involved with telephone companies
could be indefinitely kept secret from the American people?”
[Representative Robert] Goodlatte asked.
“Well,” ODNI general counsel Robert S. Litt said with a slight smile,
“we tried.”3
Greater disclosure to the public is necessary to restore the American
people’s trust that intelligence activities are not only lawful and
important to protecting our national security, but that they are
appropriate and proportional in light of the privacy interests at stake.
In the long run, our ability to protect the public requires that we have
the public’s support.4

The two epigraphs above present the critical question at the heart of
this paper: Why would or should we trust the Intelligence Community? As I
lay out in the following pages, the White House, the U.S. Department of
Justice, and National Security Agency (NSA) have repeatedly lied to (at a
minimum, misdirected) the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC),
Congress, and not least the American public.
In one of a number of op-eds and articles posted on the one-year
anniversary of the Snowden revelation, I wrote about the possible
puncturing of the protective bubble around the intelligence agencies and
what needs to be done to keep it from resealing. I return to these issues at
the end of this article.
One year ago, on June 5, 2013, Edward Snowden revealed that he had
provided several reporters with access to documents he had taken
from the National Security Agency. The subsequent carefully
researched and thoughtfully written stories blew the lid off much of the
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secrecy that the National Security Agency, the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court, the Department of Justice, and the intelligence
community had imposed on the communications surveillance in which
our government had been engaging.
A month prior to the first disclosures, in response to the advocacy
community’s requests that the opinions of the FISC be declassified,
Robert Litt, general counsel for the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence, the Justice Department and the FISA Court averred they
could not and should not be declassified; that operational details were
too completely interwoven with the legal discussions for it to be
possible to separate them out. As a result of the disclosures, the
intelligence community has been forced to declassify and release these
documents and others.
The PATRIOT Act in 2001 gave permission for the FBI to seek a court
order production of records or documents - tangible things - when
there were reasonable grounds to believe that the information sought
is relevant to an authorized investigation of international terrorism.
Over the years, we learned from a disclosure made by Snowden, this
provision was used to require companies like Verizon to “produce to
the National Security Agency (NSA)..., and continue production on an
ongoing daily basis thereafter..., unless otherwise ordered by the
court, an electronic copy of: all call detail records or “telephony
metadata” created by Verizon for communications (i) between the
United States and abroad; or (ii) wholly within the United States,
including local telephone calls.
We learned through an administration White Paper (intended to calm
the waters) that multiple FISC judges found that Section 215
authorizes such bulk collection of metadata—not to gain access to
specific items about specific persons on a case-by-case basis as the
law clearly states, but, rather, because technology makes it useful to a
“broad range of investigations of international terrorism” - which may
or may not themselves have been authorized by the FISC. Worse yet,
we further learned from a declassified and released 85-page ruling by
John Bates, then serving as chief judge on the FISC, that the court
found that its approval of a government interpretation...was “premised

Published by SJSU ScholarWorks, 2018

3

Secrecy and Society, Vol. 2, No. 1 [2018], Art. 2

on a flawed depiction” of how the program operated and “buttressed
by repeated inaccurate statements in the government’s submissions”
to the court.
The revelations have continued to this day. As a result, legislation that
makes major changes to bulk collection of call records passed the
House in 20145 - although it remains possible that it, too, will be
secretly interpreted to allow surveillance of millions of Americans. The
director of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence has
publicly accepted the need for greater transparency and taken some
steps in that direction.
The bubble that has seemed to protect the intelligence community
from President Obama’s openness initiatives may have sprung a leak.
It is essential that, as the debate over the USA FREEDOM Act moves to
the Senate, Congress ensures that this leak is not resealed, and that
future disclosures should not require anyone to take the risks Snowden
did. Instead, they should come from declassification of FISA court
decisions, public reports of how many people’s communications are
being stored in the NSA’s databases, and oversight hearings that are
open to the press and public.6

Context and Perspective
In order to understand the context for the “Snowden disclosures” and
what they have meant for Executive Branch accountability, it is necessary to
understand the course of efforts to rein in - or at least secure some (often
minimal) oversight of - the U.S. Intelligence Community. These initiatives
include the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) and the amendments
thereto, including, for the purposes of this article, the USA PATRIOT Act, the
USA Freedom Act, and the FISA Amendments Act (FAA) and its
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reauthorizations. The whole story (that we know to date) is a complicated
tale, which I try to encapsulate in this article.
This article is not written from an academic perspective; it is the
struggle of an engaged (non-lawyer) advocate to understand how the
protections of the Fourth Amendment were violated repeatedly - and outside
of scrutiny for accountability - by the U.S. Intelligence Community,
especially the White House, the Department of Justice, and the NSA, and the
roles of the Congress and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC)
in those violations. The experience has been akin to putting together a
moving puzzle without an image to use as a reference (or with only a
completely different image - such as what the statutes say) and with some
of the pieces missing, hidden, changing shapes, or somehow deliberately
obscured.
An integral part of the story is the engagement of civil society privacy, civil liberties, and open government organizations - in pushing back
against the Executive Branch (including through Freedom of Information Act
[FOIA] litigation) and in working with (and often also pushing back on)
Congress. The output of civil society has been deeply informed and
informative - and voluminous. For that reason, I have put as many as I
could locate of the letters, statements to/testimony before congressional
committees (ranging from 2002 to 2018), and commentaries (specifically on
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the 2017 reauthorization FISA Amendment) on a separate website. The links
are here.7
The dedicated reporters, all the individuals behind the scenes, and the
editors of numerous newspapers and news sites have been - and continue to
be - irreplaceable guides to the documents, the context, and the analysis of
the programs as unveiled to the public. At the end, I will try to point to some
initiatives to keep the leak in the Intelligence Community’s bubble of secrecy
from being resealed. It was a difficult task in an administration committed
(at least rhetorically) to transparency; it may well prove to be Sisyphean in
the current administration.
It is worth noting that, as of this writing, the ODNI is continuing to
declassify and release documents. Although these are quite often in
response to court orders (e.g., in FOIA litigation), some seem more
voluntary. Members of Congress have recently passed legislation to address
some of the most egregious abridgements of constitutional protections—but
ongoing oversight will be necessary.
The secret Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court also needs reform
and greater transparency. In the case of Congress and its responsibility for
oversight of the Intelligence Community (IC), it needs greater substantive
and consequential accountability to the American public. It also needs
greater internal transparency. The basic organization of the article is:
1. A discussion of the text and the intent of the legislation indicated at
the beginning of each section (including a section on the extra-

https://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/secrecyandsociety/vol2/iss1/2
DOI: 10.31979/2377-6188.2018.020102

6

McDermott: Secrets and Lies — Exposed and Combatted

legislative “President’s Surveillance Program” and one on Executive
Order 12333); the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act; Executive
Order 12333; the USA PATRIOT Act; USA PATRIOT Act Improvement
and Reauthorization Act of 2005; the President’s Surveillance
Program8; Section 702 of the 2008 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Amendments Act; the USA FREEDOM Act; and the 2017 Foreign
Surveillance Amendments Act Reauthorization;
2. What has been revealed as a result of the disclosures made by Edward
Snowden;
3. How civil society and, where known, the courts and Congress used the
revelations to enact changes in law and/or practice.
These topics are followed by discussions of the problems with
congressional and FISA Court oversight.
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978
The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA) was one of
the results of a scandal that exposed a wide range of intelligence abuses by
federal agencies, including the CIA, FBI, Internal Revenue Service, and
National Security Agency. The abuses were (and continue to be)
constitutional; the Fourth Amendment guarantees
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Background
In 1973, the Senate Watergate Committee investigation revealed that
the Executive Branch had directed national intelligence agencies to carry out
constitutionally questionable domestic security operations. Following a 1974
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front-page New York Times article by Seymour Hersh,9 claiming that the CIA
had been spying on anti-war activists for more than a decade and thus
violating the agency’s charter, former CIA officials and some lawmakers
called for a congressional inquiry.
According to Senate history, on January 21, 1975, Senator John
Pastore introduced a resolution (passed by the Senate 82-4) to establish a
select committee to investigate federal intelligence operations and determine
“the extent, if any, to which illegal, improper, or unethical activities were
engaged in by any agency of the Federal Government.”10 Majority Leader
Mike Mansfield and Republican leader Hugh Scott carefully selected
committee members; Mansfield selected as chairman Democrat Frank
Church of Idaho, a sixteen-year member of the Committee on Foreign
Relations, who had co-chaired a special committee to critically examine the
executive branch’s consolidation of power in the Cold War era. According to
the Senate history of the commission, Church recognized the strategic value
of the nation’s top intelligence agencies and was also mindful of the need for
American institutions to function within the confines of US constitutional
law.11
The Church Committee conducted a far-reaching Senate investigation
into U.S. intelligence agencies, and in the course of their work, investigators
identified programs - never before known to the public - that monitored wire
communications to and from the United States and shared some of that data
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with other intelligence agencies, including NSA’s Projects SHAMROCK and
MINARET.12
Over a nine-month period, the committee interviewed hundreds of
witnesses and conducted numerous hearings, ultimately producing analysis
demonstrating that the FBI had engaged in illegal covert operations in the
United States, and that the CIA had engaged in illegal covert operations at
home and abroad. As Scott Boykin notes, the Committee’s reports
demonstrated that the FBI and CIA had harassed civil rights and political
dissident groups, opened and read individuals’ mail, and conducted
warrantless break-ins to plant surveillance devices and steal information
regarding the groups’ members.13,14
In its final report, the Committee included 96 recommendations, both
legislative and regulatory, designed “to place intelligence activities within the
constitutional scheme for controlling government power.”15,16 The committee
observed that “there is no inherent constitutional authority for the President
or any intelligence agency to violate the law,” and recommended
strengthening oversight of intelligence activities.
In 1976, the Senate approved Senate Resolution 400, establishing the
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, to provide “vigilant legislative
oversight over the intelligence activities of the United States to assure that
such activities are in conformity with the Constitution and laws of the United
States” [emphasis added].17,18 The Committee's reports helped prompt
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significant legislative reforms, including the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act of 1978, signed into law by President Jimmy Carter.19

The FISA Court Established
The law required the Executive Branch to request warrants for
wiretapping and surveillance purposes from a newly formed FISA Court.
Under the statute as adopted, the President could authorize electronic
surveillance of foreign powers to gather intelligence upon the Attorney
General’s certification that there was no “substantial likelihood” that the
government would obtain the communications of a “United States person,”
or USP, a citizen or other lawful resident of the United States,20 and that the
minimization procedures for the surveillance protected the private
information of USPs.21
The newly created FISA Court could issue orders for electronic
surveillance of foreign powers or their agents upon application by federal
officers authorized by the Attorney General on behalf of the President. A USP
could not be regarded as a foreign power for purposes of obtaining an order
from the FISC for activities protected by the First Amendment. A USP could
be an agent of a foreign power when: the person engages in clandestine
intelligence activities on a foreign power’s behalf; such activities may involve
a violation of the criminal laws of the United States; a person engages or
prepares to engage in sabotage or international terrorism on behalf of a
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foreign power; a person enters the United States under a false identity on
behalf of a foreign power; or a person aids or abets or conspires to do any of
the foregoing. Under FISA, the location of the surveillance must be a place
that is to be used by a foreign power or its agent. The FISC order for
surveillance had to specify the target and location, the method of conducting
it, its duration, and the number of devices employed. The required
minimization procedures had to meet the same requirement as for electronic
surveillance without a court order.
Each of these requirements has been undermined in the ensuing
years.
The Erosion of Fourth Amendment Protections
In the history of the erosion of the Fourth Amendment protections
post-FISA, it is important to note that many of the erosions undertaken by
the Executive Branch did not have the sanction of legislation.

Executive Order 1233322
The Order, signed by President Ronald Reagan on December 4, 1981,
established broad new surveillance authorities for the intelligence community
and governs the NSA’s signals intelligence collection abroad; it is outside the
scope of public law.23 The Order was most recently amended on January 3,
2017. It is discussed in detail below.
The timing of the Order is not coincidental:
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At the time the order was written, the nation’s intelligence community
was dealing with a shattered reputation after decades of widespread
abuses. The Church Committee—a special congressional panel tasked
in the 1970s with investigating intelligence abuses—had revealed CIA
efforts to cover up the Watergate scandal, the CIA’s opening of
Americans’ mail, and the agency’s efforts to assassinate Cuba’s Fidel
Castro.
Executive Order 12333 was intended to bolster a reeling intelligence
community and further define its authority to conduct foreign
intelligence gathering.
The global telecommunications network didn’t exist, and collecting
foreign communications posed little risk for Americans’ data to be
swept up in the dragnet.24
The President’s Surveillance Program
The Bush Administration stacked the deck before the passage of the
PATRIOT Act. The "President's Surveillance Program" (PSP) operated in
secrecy for approximately seven years.25
I will return to the PSP after the discussion of the USA PATRIOT Act
(and its Reauthorization), because while Congress and the Bush
Administration intended the USA PATRIOT Act to strengthen the nation’s
ability to combat terrorism after the 9/11 attacks, the Bush administration
also was convinced that it needed to avoid FISA’s requirements that it obtain
judicial approval for surveillance activities. The PSP was its solution, and
Executive Order 12333 (“E.O. 12333,” discussed below) was the vehicle.26
The Program consisted of warrantless surveillance on persons the Bush
administration suspected might be involved in terrorist activities. Beginning
in 2001, the government intercepted international phone calls, and the
https://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/secrecyandsociety/vol2/iss1/2
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NSA’s STELLARWIND program mined information from email databases and
gathered telephone metadata from the databases of cellphone service
providers.27,28 The NSA also gathered and analyzed the content of telephone
conversations and email communications from these databases and, from
the beginning of the PSP through January 2007, eight percent of the
communications analyzed were those of USPs. The PSP was the first post200129 example of the focus of this article: Warrantless Surveillance Under
and Around the Law - in this case, completely around. President Bush did
not ask Congress to include provisions for the NSA domestic surveillance
program as part of the USA PATRIOT Act and did not seek any other laws to
authorize the operation. Bush administration lawyers argued that such new
laws were unnecessary, because they believed that the Congressional
resolution on the campaign against terrorism provided ample authorization.
The program was initially based on the executive’s “inherent power” to
gather foreign intelligence. After internal dissent, an additional rationale was
added: Congress’s resolution authorizing the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan
included the implicit authority to capture communications related to those
areas.30,31
Even though the Program started before the passage of the PATRIOT
Act, it is important to first understand what that law, enacted by Congress,
permitted the Department of Justice and the NSA to do in terms of
collecting, mining, and analyzing the communication records of USPs, and
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what the public and much of Congress believed were the limitations on the
government’s surveillance.32 First, though, I begin with Executive Order
12333, as it is behind the bulk and warrantless surveillance occurring since
its inception, but little discussed. After that discussion, I go to the first
legislative amendments to the FISA: the USA PATRIOT Act.

Issuance and Effects of Executive Order 12333
The NSA’s collection of information on Americans’ cellphone and
Internet usage reaches far beyond the two programs that have received
public attention (PRISM33 and “Upstream”), to a presidential order “that is
older than the Internet itself.”34,35
Indeed, documents leaked by former NSA contractor Edward Snowden
suggest that less than half of the metadata the NSA has collected has been
acquired under provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act and FISA, the two laws
that have received the most attention for permitting NSA programs: “Gen.
Keith Alexander, the (then) NSA director, has ratified that impression, saying
that the majority of NSA data is collected ‘solely pursuant to the authorities
provided by Executive Order 12333.’”36
Executive Order 12333,37 approved by President Ronald Reagan in
1981, to this day governs most of what the NSA does, outlines the duties
and foreign intelligence collection for the nation’s 17 intelligence agencies,
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and remains the primary authority under which the country’s intelligence
agencies conduct the majority of their operations.38
Under its provisions, agencies have the ability to function outside the
confines of a warrant or court order, if approved by the attorney general. Its
Section 2.5 effectively gives the attorney general the right to authorize
intelligence agencies to operate outside the confines of judicial or
congressional oversight, so long as it is in pursuit of foreign intelligence—
including collecting information of Americans: “The Attorney General hereby
is delegated the power to approve the use for intelligence purposes, within
the United States or against a United States person abroad, of any technique
for which a warrant would be required.”39
Monitoring the actual content of Americans’ communications still
requires a warrant, but metadata - the hidden information about a
communication that tells where a person is, with whom he’s communicating,
even the number of credit cards used in a transaction - can be swept up
without congressional or court approval. The Order is not governed by
Congress, and what changes have been made to it have come through
guidelines set by the Attorney General or other documents.40 The result is a
“web of intelligence law so complicated that it stymies even those tasked
with interpreting it. As one former executive official said, ‘It’s complicated
stuff.’”41
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Outdated Agency Guidelines Do Not Protect Metadata

Intelligence officials have said that each agency’s respective 12333
collection is governed by supplemental guidelines written by the attorney
general, and that those guidelines protect Americans’ data. They admitted in
2013, however, that most of those guidelines had not been revisited in
decades, and that they don’t offer the same protections as the metadata
collection programs authorized under the PATRIOT Act and FISA. At that
time, they wrote:
NSA uses EO 12333 authority to collect foreign intelligence from
communications systems around the world. Due to the fragility of
these sources, providing any significant detail outside of classified
channels is damaging to national security. Nonetheless, every type of
collection undergoes a strict oversight and compliance process internal
to NSA that is conducted by entities within NSA other than those
responsible for the actual collection.
NSA has an internal oversight and compliance framework to provide
assurance that NSA's activities - its people, its technology, and its
operations - act consistently with the law and with NSA and U.S.
intelligence community policies and procedures. This framework is
overseen by multiple organizations external to NSA, including the
Director of National Intelligence, the Attorney General, the Congress,
and for activities regulated by FISA, the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court.42
As noted, neither the regular federal courts nor the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court, which is tasked with approving some forms
of surveillance, provide meaningful or accountable oversight of EO 12333
activities. The FISC is required to authorize and oversee collection activities
conducted pursuant to FISA, to assess sufficiency of IC foreign intelligence
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procedures, and to receive compliance reports from the IC concerning only
violations of FISA, not other violations of the 4th Amendment by the IC.43

Lack of Protections and Bulk Data Collection

Senator Dianne Feinstein, then-chair of the Senate Select Committee
on Intelligence, noted that the Order has few, if any, privacy protections: “I
don’t think privacy protections are built into it. It’s an executive policy. The
executive controls intelligence in the country.”44
To this point, it is important to note (as is done below in the
discussions of legislation) that bulk data collection that occurs inside the
United States must be authorized by statute, has some protections of the
privacy of USPs, and is subject to oversight from Congress and the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court. Executive Order 12333, however, contains
no such protections for USPs if the collection occurs outside U.S. borders; it
authorizes collection of the content of communications, not just metadata,
even for USPs.45,46 Although such persons cannot be individually targeted
under 12333 without a court order, if the contents of a USP’s
communications are “incidentally” collected (an NSA term of art) in the
course of a lawful overseas foreign intelligence investigation, then Section
2.3(c) of the executive order explicitly authorizes their retention. It does not
require that the affected USPs be suspected of wrongdoing and places no
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limits on the volume of communications by USPs that may be collected and
retained.47
We do know a little about the spying conducted using EO 12333. In
November 2013, a Washington Post report revealed EO 12333 was the
NSA's claimed authority for the collection of Americans' address books and
buddy lists - as the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) put it, the NSA has
been siphoning off data from the links between Yahoo! and Google data
centers, which include the fiber optic connections between company servers
at various points around the world. As noted above, the NSA has not been
authorized by Congress or the FISC to collect contact lists in bulk, and senior
intelligence officials said it would be illegal to do so from facilities in the
United States.48,49,50,51
One official, speaking on the condition of anonymity to discuss the
classified program, said the agency avoids the restrictions in the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act by intercepting contact lists from
access points “all over the world. None of those are on U.S. territory.”
Because of the method employed—when information passes through
“the overseas collection apparatus,” the official added, “the
assumption is you’re not a U.S. person”—the agency is not legally
required or technically able to restrict its intake to contact lists
belonging to specified foreign intelligence targets, he said.
A senior U.S. intelligence official told the Post that the privacy of
Americans is protected, despite mass collection, because “we have checks
and balances built into our tools.”52
The most recent change to the Order came from President Barack
Obama in the final days of his administration. The new rules let the NSA
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share the raw streams of communications it intercepts directly with agencies
including the FBI, the DEA, and the Department of Homeland Security.
According to Robert S. Litt, the then-general counsel to the Director of
ODNI, “This is not expanding the substantive ability of law enforcement to
get access to signals intelligence. It is simply widening the aperture for a
larger number of analysts, who will be bound by the existing rules.”53
And they have checks and balances built into their tools.
The USA PATRIOT Act
Less than a week after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001,
legislative proposals to strengthen the nation’s ability to combat terrorism
after the attacks and to give broad new powers to the Executive Branch with relatively little oversight from the courts - were introduced. President
Bush signed the final bill, the USA PATRIOT54 Act (Uniting and Strengthening
America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct
Terrorism Act of 2001, P.L. 107-56),55 into law on October 26, 2001.
Although the Act made significant amendments to more than 15 important
statutes - in particular, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978
(FISA)56 and the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA)57 - it
was introduced with great haste and passed with little debate, and without a
House, Senate, or conference report.58 The Act thus lacks background
legislative history that often retrospectively provides the necessary material
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to guide statutory interpretation.

Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act
Title II of the PATRIOT Act made a number of significant changes to
the laws relating to foreign intelligence surveillance, appreciably expanding
government investigative authority. Specifically, Section 215 substantially
revised the authority under the FISA.59 It amended Title V of the FISA by
striking sections 501 through 503 of that act and inserting - as Section 215 the following: SEC. 501, Access to Certain Business Records for Foreign
Intelligence and International Terrorism Investigations, discussed below; and
SEC. 502 on Congressional Oversight.60
•

What Kind of Records? Under the (unamended) FISA, the FISA Court
(FISC) could issue orders for electronic surveillance of foreign powers
or their agents. Section 215 broadened the government’s authority by
eliminating any limitation on the types records that may be seized:
(a)(1) The Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation or a
designee of the Director (whose rank shall be no lower than Assistant
Special Agent in Charge61) may make an application for an order
requiring the production of any tangible things (including books,
records, papers, documents, and other items) for an investigation to
protect against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence
activities.

•

With What Authorization? Under the FISA,62 a judge having
jurisdiction63 could issue orders for electronic surveillance of foreign
powers or their agents upon application by federal officers authorized
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by the Attorney General on behalf of the President, upon the Attorney
General’s certification that there was no “substantial likelihood” that
the government would obtain the communications of a USP (a citizen
or other lawful resident of the United States), and that the private
information of USPs was protected by the minimization procedures for
the surveillance.
Section 215 shifts the authorization from the Attorney General to the
Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation or a designee of the
Director (of a rank no lower than Assistant Special Agent in Charge).
•

For Whose Records? Under the FISA, a USP could not be regarded as a
foreign power for purposes of obtaining an order from the FISC for
activities protected by the First Amendment.
Section 215 states that an investigation conducted under this section
should be conducted under guidelines approved by the Attorney
General under Executive Order 12333 (or a successor order); and not
“be conducted of a United States person solely upon the basis of
activities protected by the first amendment to the Constitution of the
United States.”
The incorporation of Section 501 of the FISA into Section 215 of the
PATRIOT Act permitted the FBI to apply to the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court (FISC) for an order to seize business records of
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hotels, motels, car and truck rental agencies, and storage rental
facilities.
•

For What Purposes? Under the FISA, an application for an order
allowing electronic surveillance required a statement of a federal
officer under oath attesting to the identity or description of a proposed
target for surveillance, a statement of the “facts and circumstances”
showing that the target is “being used or is about to be used” by “a
foreign power or an agent of a foreign power,” a description of the
communications sought and the types of communications being
sought, and “that a significant purpose of the surveillance is to obtain
foreign intelligence information” that cannot be obtained by ordinary
intelligence-gathering techniques [emphasis added].
“Foreign intelligence information” in the FISA (unamended) is limited

to that needed to protect the United States against hostile acts, terrorism, or
intelligence operations directed against the United States by a foreign power
or its agent. A judge must find that there is probable cause showing that the
target of the surveillance is a foreign power or its agent, and that the
facilities targeted are being used or are about to be used by a foreign power
or its agent.64
As noted earlier, under the FISA, the location of the surveillance must
be a place that is to be used by a foreign power or its agent. The FISC order
for surveillance had to specify the target and location, the method of
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conducting it, its duration, and the number of devices employed. The
minimization procedures had to meet the same requirement as for electronic
surveillance without a court order.
Section 215 only required the government to assert that the records or
other things are ”sought for an authorized investigation conducted in
accordance with subsection (a)(2) to obtain foreign intelligence information
not concerning a United States person or to protect against international
terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities.”65 The terms “foreign
intelligence information” and “international terrorism” are undefined. There
is no requirement for an evidentiary or factual showing and the judge has
little discretion in reviewing an application, nor is there the limitation on
place.

Section 505 of the USA PATRIOT Act
Section 505 allowed the use of National Security Letters (NSLs) when
seeking information "relevant" in authorized national security investigations
to protect against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence
activities. A National Security Letter is a type of administrative subpoena: a
written demand from the FBI that compels Internet service providers (ISPs),
credit companies, financial institutions, and others to hand over confidential
records of their customers, including, but not limited to, subscriber
information, phone numbers and email addresses, and websites visited. The
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recipient of the order may not disclose the fact that the FBI has sought or
obtained records.66
•

Who authorizes such Letters? As long as the head of an FBI field office
certifies that the records would be relevant to a counterterrorism
investigation, the Bureau can send a National Security Letter request
without the approval of a judge or grand jury - it is not a warrant.
The USA PATRIOT Act was modified by the USA PATRIOT Act

Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005 (immediately below) and the
USA FREEDOM Act (discussed later).

USA PATRIOT Act Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005
The American Library Association, the American Civil Liberties Union,
Bill of Rights Defense Committee, and many others were engaged over a
number of years in pushing in public and in Congress for changes to the USA
PATRIOT Act to protect privacy and civil liberties.67 The reauthorizing
legislation addressed a number of concerns of the privacy and civil liberties
communities.
Section 215 orders:
•

A Section 215 order cannot be issued unless the information sought is
relevant to (rather than just “sought for”) an authorized national
security investigation (other than a threat assessment).

•

The FISA court is allowed to issue a section 215 order for certain more
sensitive categories of documents—such as library, bookstore,
medical, tax return, and gun sale records. The application must be
signed by either the Director or Deputy Director of the FBI (rather than
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a designee of the Director (of a rank no lower than Assistant Special
Agent in Charge).
•

It requires the Attorney General to develop and apply "minimization
procedures" limiting the retention and dissemination of information
concerning USPs obtained through section 215 orders - thus restoring
a requirement under the original FISA.

•

It allows explicit judicial review of NSLs and any accompanying
nondisclosure orders, and provides that nondisclosure orders no longer
automatically attach to NSL requests.

•

It clarifies that a recipient may disclose receipt of an NSL to those
necessary to comply with it, or to an attorney in order to obtain legal
advice or assistance with respect to it.

•

It explicitly allows recipients to seek judicial review, to disclose receipt
of a 215 order to attorneys in order to obtain legal advice or
assistance, and to other people necessary to comply with the request.
Section 206 roving surveillance orders: This Section allows the FISC to

issue an electronic surveillance order that attaches to a particular target,
rather than to a particular phone or computer. It clarifies the level of detail
necessary to obtain a section 206 order, particularly where the target is
identified by a description rather than by name.68
Sunsetted Provisions: The reauthorizing legislation made permanent
14 of the 16 sunsetted USA PATRIOT Act provisions. It placed four-year
sunsets on the other two - the authority to conduct "roving" surveillance
under the FISA; and the authority to request production of business records
under FISA (USA PATRIOT Act sections 206 and 215, respectively).69
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What We Learned as a Result of the Snowden Documents70
The Scope of Collection under Section 215
•

FISA Court Order to Verizon to provide a broad data collection: On
June 5, 2013, we learned that Verizon (and others) were required to
indiscriminately provide all71 domestic call detail records to the NSA
under an April 25, 2013 court-order.72 This requirement was made
under the auspices of Section 215, which, as written, did not authorize
such an unspecific collection.
There was a veiled indication of this use of Section 215 in 2011 when
the acting head of the Justice Department’s National Security Division
Todd Hinnen testified that “some orders have also been used to
support important and highly sensitive intelligence collection
operations, on which this committee and others have been separately
briefed.73 On average, we seek and obtain section 215 orders less than
40 times per year.” I return to this testimony below.
How did we get from the Section 215 statutory language “tangible
things” (as normally understood) relevant to an authorized
investigation of international terrorism, to the language from the Court
Order below?
[T]he Custodian of Records shall produce to the National Security
Agency (NSA) upon service of this Order, and continue production on
an ongoing daily basis thereafter for the duration of this Order, unless
otherwise ordered by the Court, an electronic copy of the following
tangible things: all call detail records or "telephony metadata" created
by Verizon for communications (i) between the United States and
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abroad; or (ii) wholly within the United States, including local
telephone calls.
Before Snowden provided journalists with the FISC order to Verizon, it
was assumed (with some suspicion) by the civil liberties community
(and many in the media) that Section 215 was being used in discrete
requests to obtain individual collections of records about known
counterintelligence or terrorist suspects - “for records showing, say,
that a certain person made certain purchases from a certain vendor or
used a particular telephone to make specific calls”74 [emphasis added].
•

FBI Director Mueller’s Response re “increase in the volume of business
records requests”: In a 2011 response (apparently to a congressional
Questions for the Record), then-FBI Director Mueller indicated that,
beginning in late 2009, certain electronic communications service
providers no longer honored National Security Letters (under Section
505) to obtain records because of what their lawyers cited as “an
ambiguity” in the law.75 As a result, Mueller said, the FBI had switched
over to demanding the same “business records” data under Section
215.
According to Mueller, “This change accounts for a significant increase
in the volume of business records requests.” As noted above, however,
Todd Hinnen’s 2011 testimony suggested that these orders were
comparatively rare: “we seek and obtain section 215 orders less than
40 times per year.”76
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Before Snowden, the public was prevented from knowing that behind
the small number (212 requests in 2012) of Section 215 requests,
applications to the FISC “for access to certain business records
(including the production of tangible things) for foreign intelligence
purposes” were the massive numbers involved in the bulk collections
of metadata on calls “wholly within the United States, including local
telephone calls.”

Administration White Paper
Through the August 2013 Administration White Paper77, we learned
that multiple FISC judges - beginning in 2006 - found that Section 215
authorizes the collection of telephony metadata in bulk.78 According to the
Administration, the FISC judges considered that the telephony metadata
collection program meets the “relevance” standard of Section 215 because
there are “reasonable grounds to believe” that this category of data, when
queried and analyzed consistent with the Court-approved standards,79 will
produce information pertinent to FBI investigations of international
terrorism, because
certain analytic tools used to accomplish this objective require the
collection and storage of a large volume of telephony metadata [and]
… communications metadata is different from many other kinds of
records because it is inter-connected and the connections between
individual data points, which can be reliably identified only through
analysis of a large volume of data, are particularly important to a
broad range of investigations of international terrorism [emphasis
added].80
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So, the FBI and the NSA were authorized to get this information, not in
order to gain access to specific items about specific persons on a case-bycase basis, but, rather, because technology makes it useful to a “broad
range of investigations of international terrorism” - which may or may not
themselves have been authorized by the FISC.
•

New NSA Term “hops”: In 2013, a new term, “hops,” was added to our
vocabulary. In his testimony81 before the House Judiciary Committee82
NSA Deputy Director John Chris Inglis stated that the FISA court "has
approved us to go out two or three hops" - or, as we now know, to
“contact chain.”83 The Washington Post explained:
When analysts think they have cause to suspect an individual, they will
look at everyone that person has contacted, called the first hop away
from the target. Then, in a series of exponential ripples, they look at
everyone all those secondary people communicated with. And from
that pool, they look at everyone those tertiary people contacted. This
is called a second and a third hop.84
As members of the committee were quick to point out at the time, this
is not what the law, as passed by Congress, allows.85 Indeed, at this
hearing, Representative Jerrold Nadler told Deputy Attorney General
James Cole, "The statute says 'collection.' You're trying to confuse us
by talking use."86
And indeed, it seems that the DOJ officials were trying to do just that.
Inglis and Cole actually were referring to a 2007 Justice Department
memo87 (discussed below under President’s Surveillance Program), in
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which the Department of Defense (NSA) sought Attorney General
approval pursuant to Executive Order 12333 of a proposed
amendment to “procedures governing the National Security Agency's
Signals Intelligence Activities.”88
The NSA was quite willing to misdirect the FISC as well as Congress.
As we will see below (in the President’s Surveillance Program section), in a
discussion of Judge Bates’ Opinion - also declassified as a result of the
Snowden disclosures - the FISC approval of contact chaining (hops) was
sought under the various permutations of the President’s/Terrorist
Surveillance Program.89
FISA Court Documents Detailing the Court’s Interpretation of Section
215
In September 2013, in response to a court order in a 2011 EFF lawsuit
(see below under President’s Surveillance Program, Civil Society
Engagement), the government released hundreds of pages of previously
secret FISA documents detailing the court’s interpretation of Section 215,
including an opinion excoriating the NSA for misusing its mass surveillance
database for years (see below).90

Civil Society Engagement

The American Library Association, the American Civil Liberties Union,
Bill of Rights Defense Committee, and many others were engaged over a
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number of years in pushing - in public and in Congress - for changes to the
USA PATRIOT Act to protect privacy and civil liberties.91 These efforts came
to some fruition in the 2005 Amendments (see above).
On October 26, 2011, EFF sued the Department of Justice (DOJ) for
answers about “secret interpretations” of a controversial section of the law.92
On June 11, 2013, the American Civil Liberties Union and the New York Civil
Liberties Union filed a challenge (ACLU v. Clapper) with the FISC, requesting
that it publish its opinions on the meaning, scope, and constitutionality of
Section 215.93,94 The organization filed its motion after Guardian disclosed
(based on Snowden-provided documents) a secret FISC order (regarding
Verizon) - issued under Section 215 of the PATRIOT Act - authorizing the
bulk collection of Americans’ call records.95
In September 2013, in response to a court order in the lawsuit, the
government released hundreds of pages of previously secret FISA
documents detailing the court’s interpretation of Section 215, noted above.96
In October 2013, the government released a second batch of documents
related to Section 215, which showed, among other things, that the NSA had
collected cell site locations without notifying its oversight committees in
Congress or the FISA court.97
In November 2013, the ACLU and the Yale Law School’s Media
Freedom and Information Access (MFIA) clinic filed a second motion, seeking
to uncover the legal underpinnings of the government’s bulk collection of
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Americans’ data more broadly.98,99

What Has Occurred Since?

Bulk Collection under Section 215 Ruled Illegal: On May 7, 2015, in a
97-page ruling, ACLU v. Clapper, a three-judge panel (Gerald E. Lynch,
Robert D. Stack, and Vernon S. Broderick) of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit held, on May 7, 2015, that Section 215 of the
USA PATRIOT Act cannot be legitimately interpreted to allow the bulk
collection of domestic calling records.100 This ruling was the first time a
higher-level court in the regular judicial system (i.e., not the FISC) reviewed
the NSA phone records program.101
In the unanimous ruling written by Judge Gerard E. Lynch, the court
held that Section 215 “cannot bear the weight the government asks us to
assign to it, and that it does not authorize the telephone metadata
program.”102 In declaring the program illegal, the court said, “We do so
comfortably in the full understanding that if Congress chooses to authorize
such a far-reaching and unprecedented program, it has every opportunity to
do so, and to do so unambiguously.”103
The ruling raised the question of whether Section 215, extended or
not, has ever legitimately authorized the program.104 The court said that the
statute on its face permits only the collection of records deemed “relevant”
to a national security case. Judge Lynch wrote:
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Such expansive development of government repositories of formerly
private records would be an unprecedented contraction of the privacy
expectations of all Americans. Perhaps such a contraction is required
by national security needs in the face of the dangers of contemporary
domestic and international terrorism. But we would expect such a
momentous decision to be preceded by substantial debate, and
expressed in unmistakable language.105
As discussed below, under the President’s Surveillance Program, the
data collection had repeatedly been approved in secret by judges serving on
the FISC. Those judges heard arguments only from the government, and
they accepted the interpretation of Section 215 now rejected by the appeals
court.106
•

Renewal of Non-Permanent Provisions of the PATRIOT Act: Three
provisions of the PATRIOT Act that must be renewed periodically
expired on June 1, 2015. With the passage of the USA Freedom Act
(USAF) (discussed below) on June 2, 2015, these provisions were
extended for four years: roving wiretaps (authorized for sometimes
unnamed targets who communicate with multiple devices rather than
a communications line or device); court-ordered searches of business
records; and surveillance of non-American “lone wolf” suspects without
confirmed ties to terrorist groups.107
The USAF also blocks the government from transferring mass phone
record collection, such as national security letter statutes or Section
214 of the PATRIOT Act, to other authorities.108
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President’s Surveillance Program (PSP)
The PSP was the first post-2001 example of the focus of this article:
Warrantless Surveillance Under and Around the Law - in this case,
completely around.109 As noted earlier, while Congress and the Bush
Administration intended the USA PATRIOT Act to strengthen the nation’s
ability to combat terrorism after the 9/11 attacks, the Bush administration
also was convinced that it needed to avoid FISA’s requirements that it obtain
judicial approval for surveillance activities. The PSP was its solution, and
E.O. 12333 was the vehicle.110 President Bush did not ask Congress to
include provisions for the NSA domestic surveillance program as part of the
USA PATRIOT Act and did not seek any other laws to authorize the
operation.
On 4 October 2001, President George W. Bush issued a
memorandum entitled Authorization For Specified Electronic Surveillance
Activities During A Limited Period To Detect And Prevent Acts Of Terrorism
Within The United States. The Presidential authorization delegated authority
to the Secretary of Defense, who further delegated it to the Director of
National Security Agency/Chief, Central Security Service (DIRNSA/CHCSS)
to conduct specified electronic surveillance on targets related to Afghanistan
and international terrorism for 30 days. Because the surveillance included
wire and cable communications carried out into or out of the United States,
it would otherwise have required FISC authority [emphasis added].111

https://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/secrecyandsociety/vol2/iss1/2
DOI: 10.31979/2377-6188.2018.020102

34

McDermott: Secrets and Lies — Exposed and Combatted

Operating Outside the Law

Although the Authorization document may seem somewhat limited, it
metastasized into the President’s Surveillance Program (PSP), known
publicly - after two New York Times stories exposed it in December 2005 as the Terrorist Surveillance Program.112,113 It operated literally “around” and
outside congressionally passed law discussed in this article (although the
FISA Court and, at some point, some parts of Congress became aware of
it).114 The Authorization highlights the intent of the Bush Administration to
operate surveillance activities inside the United States, which had been
barred by law and agency policy for decades, and to do so outside the
context of warrants and, thus, of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court.
Within the Bush administration, Department of Justice lawyers argued
that new laws were unnecessary; they believed that the congressional
resolution on the campaign against terrorism provided ample authorization.
The program was initially based on the executive’s “inherent power” to
gather foreign intelligence. After internal dissent, an additional rationale was
added: Congress’s resolution authorizing the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan
included the implicit authority to capture communications related to those
areas.115
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Warrantless Surveillance and STELLARWIND

STELLARWIND consisted of warrantless surveillance on persons the
Bush administration suspected might be involved in terrorist activities.
Beginning in 2001, the government intercepted international phone calls,
and the NSA’s STELLARWIND program mined information from email
databases and gathered telephone metadata from the databases of
cellphone service providers.116,117 The NSA also gathered and analyzed the
content of telephone conversations and email communications from these
databases and, from the beginning of the PSP through January 2007, eight
percent of the communications analyzed were those of USPs.
According to a 2009 Report prepared by the Inspectors General of the
involved agencies (discussed in detail below), the NSA cited authorization for
the President’s Surveillance Program under E.O. 12333:
For more than a decade before the terrorist attacks of 11 September
2001 ... NSA was authorized by Executive Order (E.O.) 12333, United
States Intelligence Activities, 4 December 1981, as amended, to
collect, process, and disseminate SIGINT information
for foreign intelligence and counterintelligence purposes ... In
September 2001, NSA’s compliance procedures defined foreign
communications as communications having at least one communicant
outside the United States, communications entirely among foreign
powers, or communications between a foreign power and officers or
employees of a foreign power. All other communications were
considered domestic communications. NSA was not authorized under
E.O. 12333 to collect communications from a wire in the United States
without a court order unless the communications originated and
terminated outside the United States or met applicable exceptions to
the requirement of a court order under FISA.118
In late September, [Michael] Hayden informed [George] Tenet119 that
he had expanded SIGINT120 operations under E.O. 12333 authority.

https://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/secrecyandsociety/vol2/iss1/2
DOI: 10.31979/2377-6188.2018.020102

36

McDermott: Secrets and Lies — Exposed and Combatted

According to Hayden, Tenet later said that he had explained the NSA's
expanded SIGINT operations to Vice President Cheney during a
meeting at the White House. On 2 October 2001, Hayden briefed the
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence on his decision to
expand operations under E.O. 12333 and informed members of the
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence by telephone.
According to Hayden, Tenet told him that during the meeting the Vice
President asked if the IC was doing everything possible to prevent
another attack. The Vice President specifically asked Tenet if NSA
could do more...Hayden told Tenet that nothing more could be done
within existing authorities. In a follow-up telephone conversation,
Tenet asked Hayden what the NSA could do if it was provided
additional authorities. To formulate a response, Hayden met with NSA
personnel, who were already working to fill intelligence gaps, to
identify additional authorities to support SIGINT collection activities
that would be operationally useful and technically feasible. In
particular, discussions focused on how NSA might bridge the
“international gap,” i.e., collection of international communications in
which one communicant was within the United States....
After consulting with NSA personnel, he discussed with the White
House how FISA constrained NSA collection of communications earned
on a wire in the United States. Hayden explained that NSA could not
collect from a wire in the United States, without a court order, content
or metadata from communications that originated and/or terminated in
the United States. Hayden also said that communications metadata do
not have the same level of constitutional protection as the content of
communications and that access to metadata concerning
communications having one end in the United States would
significantly enhance NSA’s analytic capabilities. Hayden suggested
that the ability to collect communications that originated or terminated
in the United States without a court order would increase NSA’s speed
and agility. After two additional meetings with Vice President Cheney
to discuss further how NSA collection capabilities could be expanded
along the lines described at the White House meeting, the Vice
President told Hayden to work out a solution with Counsel to the Vice
President David Addington [emphasis added].121
Inspectors General Report on PSP Required by Congress
Title III of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978
Amendments Act of 2008 (FISA Amendments Act)- signed into law on July
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10, 2008 - required the Inspectors General of Intelligence Community
agencies that participated in the PSP (the Inspectors General [IGs] of the
DoD, DOJ, CIA, NSA, and ODNI; collectively, the "PSP IG Group") to conduct
a comprehensive review of the program.
•

Why Did Congress Require the Report? Before going on to some of the
findings of unclassified partial version of the Report, it is worth
remembering how Congress came to know (at least most of Congress
and at least publicly) about the very secret President’s Surveillance
Program (or, after it was publicly exposed, the “Terrorist Surveillance
Program”). The depth charges were two December 16, 2005 stories in
the New York Times.122,123
According to the Times, administration officials told the authors that
the administration had briefed Congressional leaders about the
program and notified the judge in charge of the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court. (See discussion of the briefings in the June 15,
2013, Washington Post story below.) According to the Times,
government officials indicated that “over the past three years”124 in an
effort to track possible "dirty numbers" linked to Al Qaeda,” the NSA
had monitored without warrants the international telephone calls and
international e-mail messages of hundreds - perhaps thousands - of
people inside the United States [emphasis added]. The Agency,

https://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/secrecyandsociety/vol2/iss1/2
DOI: 10.31979/2377-6188.2018.020102

38

McDermott: Secrets and Lies — Exposed and Combatted

according to these officials, still sought warrants to monitor entirely
domestic communications.
As the Times noted, this previously undisclosed decision to permit
some warrantless eavesdropping inside the country without court
approval was a major shift in American intelligence-gathering
practices, particularly for the NSA, whose mission is to spy on
communications abroad. As a result, according to the authors, some
officials familiar with the continuing operation questioned whether the
surveillance had stretched, if not crossed, constitutional limits on legal
searches: A former senior official who specializes in national security
law said, "This is really a sea change. It's almost a mainstay of this
country that the NSA only does foreign searches."125
One week later, Risen and Lichtblau revealed that the NSA had also
been capturing American communications on a much broader scale by
"tapping directly into some of the American telecommunication system's
main arteries" with the cooperation of U.S. telecommunications
companies.126 As discussed below (under the discussion of Section 702), in
2013 (as a result of the Snowden revelations), the former was revealed as
Upstream, and the latter was revealed as PRISM.
After the New York Times stories, President Bush admitted to a small
aspect of the program - the monitoring of the communications of between
500 and 1000 people inside the United States with suspected connections to
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Al Qaeda. As the EFF has detailed,127 however, “other aspects of the
Program were aimed not just at targeted individuals, but perhaps millions of
innocent Americans never suspected of a crime.”128
After a public outcry, the "Terrorist Surveillance Program" was
technically terminated in 2007. The FISA Court and Congress ultimately
ratified the program, however, and Congress amended FISA in 2007 (the
Protect America Act) and 2008 (the FISA Amendments Act [FAA]) to grant
the agency even broader data-gathering powers, under Section 702
(discussed below).129

Two Versions: Unclassified and Partial, Declassified and Full130
The 43-page unclassified review report was released on July 10, 2009.
As the New York Times reported at the time, however, “The bulk of the
findings remain classified in separate reports from each of the five inspectors
general, who represent the Justice Department, the N.S.A, the C.I.A., the
Defense Department and the Office of National Intelligence.”131
According to the unclassified version of the IGs’ Report:
The President authorized the NSA to undertake a number of new,
highly classified intelligence activities. All of these activities were
authorized in a single Presidential Authorization that was periodically
reauthorized. The specific intelligence activities that were permitted by
the Presidential Authorizations remain highly classified, except that
beginning in December 2005 the President and other Administration
officials acknowledged that these activities included the interception
without a court order132 of certain international communications where
there is "a reasonable basis to conclude that one party to the
communication is a member of al-Qa'ida, affiliated with al-Qa'ida, or a
member of an organization affiliated with al-Qa'ida." The President and
other Administration officials referred to this publicly disclosed activity
as the "Terrorist Surveillance Program," a convention we follow in this
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unclassified report. We refer to other intelligence activities authorized
under the Presidential Authorizations as the "Other Intelligence
Activities.133
The specific details of the Other Intelligence Activities remain highly
classified, although the Attorney General publicly acknowledged the
existence of such activities in August 2007.134 Together, the Terrorist
Surveillance Program and the Other Intelligence Activities comprise the PSP.
The Presidential Authorizations were issued at intervals of approximately
every 45 days.… [W]ith each reauthorization the CIA and later the NCTC
prepared an assessment of current potential terrorist threats and a
summary of intelligence gathered through the PSP and other means
during the previous authorization period.… Each of the Presidential
Authorizations included a finding to the effect that an extraordinary
emergency continued to exist, and that the circumstances "constitute an
urgent and compelling governmental interest" justifying the activities
being authorized without a court order.
Although there was no legal requirement that the Authorizations be
certified by the Attorney General or other Department of Justice official,
current and former DOJ officials told us that this certification added value by
giving the program a sense of legitimacy. Former Attorney General Gonzales
stated that the NSA was being asked to do something it had not done
before, and it was important to assure the NSA that the Attorney General
had approved the legality of the program. He also stated that it was
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important that the cooperating private sector personnel know that the
Attorney General had approved the program. In addition, Gonzales said that
for "purely political considerations" the Attorney General's approval of the
program would have value "prospectively" in the event of congressional or
inspector general reviews of the program [emphasis added].135
Attorney General Ashcroft gave his legal authorization to the program
for the first two and a half years based on a “misimpression” of what
activities the NSA was actually conducting.136 In March 2004, a showdown
occurred in Mr. Ashcroft’s hospital room when top Justice Department
officials refused to sign off on the legality of the program and threatened to
resign. The report said that the White House had the program continue by
having Mr. Gonzales, then the White House counsel, sign the authorization
[emphasis added].137
The 747-page fully declassified138 version was released on April 24,
2015, in response to a FOIA lawsuit brought by the New York Times.139 The
declassified version includes information about the Stellarwind (the code
name for the President’s Surveillance Program140) program: the NSA mining
of information from email databases and gathered telephone metadata from
the databases of cellphone service providers; and its gathering and analysis
of the content of telephone conversations and email communications from
these databases.
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What We Learned as a Result of the Snowden Documents
A June 15, 2013 article in The Washington Post provides a good
summary of some of what we learned from the Snowden documents.
Primary among these is that ”STELLARWIND was succeeded by four major
lines of intelligence collection in the territorial United States, together
capable of spanning the full range of modern telecommunications, according
to the interviews and documents”141:
Two of the four collection programs, one each for telephony and the
Internet, process trillions of “metadata” records for storage and
analysis in systems called MAINWAY and MARINA, respectively.
Metadata includes highly revealing information about the times,
places, devices and participants in electronic communication, but not
its contents. The bulk collection of telephone call records from Verizon
Business Services, disclosed this month by the British newspaper
Guardian, is one source of raw intelligence for MAINWAY.
The other two types of collection, which operate on a much smaller
scale, are aimed at content. One of them intercepts telephone calls
and routes the spoken words to a system called NUCLEON.
For Internet content, the most important source collection is the
PRISM project reported on June 6 by The Washington Post and
Guardian. It draws from data held by Google, Yahoo, Microsoft and
other Silicon Valley giants, collectively the richest depositories of
personal information in history.
The article continued to give historical context to these disclosures:
In the urgent aftermath of Sept. 11, 2001, with more attacks thought
to be imminent, analysts wanted to use “contact chaining” techniques
to build what the NSA describes as network graphs of people who
represented potential threats.
The legal challenge for the NSA was that its practice of collecting high
volumes of data from digital links did not seem to meet even the
relatively low requirements of Bush’s authorization, which allowed
collection of Internet metadata “for communications with at least one
communicant outside the United States or for which no communicant
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was known to be a citizen of the United States,” the NSA inspector
general’s report said.142
Lawyers for the agency came up with an interpretation that said the
NSA did not “acquire” the communications, a term with formal
meaning in surveillance law, until analysts ran searches against it. The
NSA could “obtain” metadata in bulk, they argued, without meeting
the required standards for acquisition. [Jack] Goldsmith and [James]
Comey did not buy that argument, and a high-ranking U.S. intelligence
official said the NSA does not rely on it today, saying that as soon as
surveillance data “touches us, we’ve got it, whatever verbs you choose
to use. We’re not saying there’s a magic formula that lets us have it
without having it.”
When Comey finally ordered a stop to the program, Bush signed an
order renewing it anyway. Comey, Goldsmith, FBI Director Robert S.
Mueller III and most of the senior Bush appointees in the Justice
Department began drafting letters of resignation. Then-NSA Director
Michael V. Hayden was not among them.
According to the inspector general’s classified report, Cheney’s lawyer,
[David] Addington, placed a phone call and “General Hayden had to
decide whether NSA would execute the Authorization without the
Attorney General’s signature.” He decided to go along.
The following morning, when Mueller told Bush that he and Comey
intended to resign, the president reversed himself.
Three months later, on July 15, [2004,] the secret surveillance court
allowed the NSA to resume bulk collection under the court’s own
authority. The opinion, which remains highly classified, was based on a
provision of electronic surveillance law, known as “pen register, trap
and trace,” that was written to allow law enforcement officers to obtain
the phone numbers of incoming and outgoing calls from a single
telephone line.…
As for bulk collection of Internet metadata, the question that triggered
the crisis of 2004, another official said the NSA is no longer doing it.
When pressed on that question, he said he was speaking only of
collections under authority of the surveillance court.143
“I’m not going to say we’re not collecting any Internet metadata,” he
added. “We’re not using this program and these kinds of accesses to
collect Internet metadata in bulk” [emphases added].144
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We will see, in the discussion of Section 702 later, that the program
conducted under the FISC’s authority is also implicated in the “incidental”
collection of the content of USPs:
When the NSA aims for foreign targets whose communications cross
U.S. infrastructure, it expects to sweep in some American content
“incidentally” or “inadvertently,” which are terms of art in regulations
governing the NSA. Contact chaining, because it extends to the
contacts of contacts of targets, inevitably collects even more American
data.…
When asked why the NSA could not release an unclassified copy of its
“minimization procedures,” which are supposed to strip accidentally
collected records of their identifying details, the official suggested a
reporter submit a freedom-of-information request.145
Declassified Inspectors General Report
The 2013 disclosures by Snowden included a draft version of the NSA
Inspector General’s contribution to the 2009 43-page unclassified version.146
It omitted discussion of many key facts that, then, were still classified. The
government subsequently declassified many facts about surveillance.
The New York Times filed a FOIA lawsuit seeking release of the 747page full and final report.147 On April 24, 2015, in response to the lawsuit,
the government fully declassified148 the 2009 IG’s Report.
•

Declassified 2011 Opinion of FISC Judge John D. Bates149: In an 85page October 2011 ruling (declassified and released post-Snowden),
Judge Bates (then serving as chief judge on the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court) wrote that the court found that its approval, in
March 2009, of a government presentation to justify the bulk collection
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of all Americans' phone call records was "premised on a flawed
depiction" of how the program operated and how the NSA uses the
data and "buttressed by repeated inaccurate statements in the
government's submissions" to the court.150,151,152,153,154
In a footnote, Bates wrote: “This misperception by the FISC existed
from the inception of its authorized collection in May 2006, buttressed
by repeated inaccurate statements made in the government’s
submissions, and despite a government-devised and court-mandated
oversight regime” [emphasis added].155
The inaccurate statements were noted in a separate footnote,
discussed below; they concerned revelations regarding the scope
(volume and nature) of the NSA’s acquisition of Internet transactions.

Misdirection by the NSA and the Department of Justice
It is evident in the Bates opinion that the NSA and the Department of
Justice were as willing to misdirect the FISC as they were to misdirect
Congress in the hearing before the House Judiciary Committee.156,157 The
Court’s approval of contact chaining (hops) was based on “inaccurate
statements made in the government’s submissions.” The approval was
sought under the various permutations of the President’s/Terrorist
Surveillance Program.158 When NSA Deputy Director John Chris Inglis, in his
testimony before the House Judiciary Committee stated that the FISA court

https://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/secrecyandsociety/vol2/iss1/2
DOI: 10.31979/2377-6188.2018.020102

46

McDermott: Secrets and Lies — Exposed and Combatted

"has approved us to go out two or three hops,"159 and Deputy Attorney
General James Cole said,
The short court order...does not allow the government to access or use
them. That is covered by another, more detailed court order [that]...
provides that the government can only search the data if it has a
reasonable, articulable suspicion that the phone number being
searched is associated with certain terrorist organizations,160
they were referring to a 2007 Justice Department memo, discussed below.161
In it, the Department of Defense (NSA) sought Attorney General approval
pursuant to Executive Order 12333 of a proposed amendment to procedures
governing the National Security Agency's Signals Intelligence Activities.162

2007 Justice Department Memo
The FISC ruling seems to point to a January 2007 announcement in
which the Justice Department said it had worked out an “innovative”
arrangement with the FISC that provided the “necessary speed and agility”
to provide court review of all warrants on all wiretaps in terrorism
investigations to monitor international communications of people inside the
United States without jeopardizing national security.163 What these terms
meant was made clear at the announcement: A week prior, the Justice
Department had obtained multiple orders or warrants (certifications) from
the FISA court allowing it to monitor international communications in cases
where there was probable cause to believe one of the participants was linked
to Al Qaeda or an affiliated terrorist group.164 According to then-Attorney
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General Gonzales, “as a result of these orders any electronic surveillance
that was occurring as part of the Terrorist Surveillance Program [emphasis
added] will now be conducted subject to the approval of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court.”165

Permission to Gather and Analyze Metadata on U.S. Persons

Thanks to a Justice Department Memo, disclosed by Snowden, we
know what the basis was for the “innovative arrangement.” The NSA
gained166 authority to "analyze communications metadata associated with
United States persons and persons believed to be in the United States,"
according to a November 20, 2007, Justice Department memo,167 in which,
as noted above, the Department of Defense (NSA) sought Attorney General
approval pursuant to Executive Order 12333 of a proposed amendment to
procedures governing the National Security Agency's Signals Intelligence
Activities [emphasis added].168,169 The synopsis states that the
“supplemental procedures”
would clarify that the National Security Agency (NSA) may analyze
communications metadata associated with United States persons and
persons believed to be in the United States. These Supplemental
Procedures would amend the existing procedures promulgated
pursuant to Executive Order 12.333. That Order requires the NSA to
conduct its signals intelligence activities involving the collection,
retention, or dissemination of information concerning United States
persons in accordance with procedures approved by the Attorney
General. Accordingly, changes to these procedures, such as those
proposed here, also require your approval. We conclude that the
proposed Supplemental Procedures are consistent with applicable law
and we recommend that you approve them [emphasis added].
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The communications metadata that the NSA wishes to []170 relates to
telephone calls and electronic dialing, routing, addressing, and
signaling information that does not concern the substance, purport, or
meaning of the communication. … This communications metadata has
been obtained by various methods, including pursuant to the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), 50 U.S.C. 1801171, et seq.,
[emphasis added] and resides in NSA databases. NSA plans to analyze
this data primarily using a technique known as "contact chaining."
Contact chaining involves the identification of telephone numbers,
email addresses, or IP addresses that a targeted telephone number, IP
address, or e-mail address has contacted or attempted to contact.172
In January 2008, Attorney General Michael B. Mukasey signed the
document (including a set of “Supplemental Procedures” on the use of
Americans’ Internet metadata that had been signed in October 2007 by
Secretary of Defense Robert Gates), stating:
NSA will continue to disseminate the results of its contact chaining and
other analysis of communications metadata in accordance with current
procedures governing the dissemination of information concerning U.S.
persons," without detailing the "current procedures."173

The Program Continues through the Obama Administration

This program continued for more than two years into the Obama
administration.174 In response to the release of the November 2007 Memo,
the ACLU submitted a FOIA request to the DOJ in relation to the information
presented in the 2007 announcement. (See below under Civil Society
Engagement.)
•

FISA Court Opinion Granting the Application Made by the Government
in 2006: The Opinion of the FISC granting the Government’s
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application, made in the Government Memorandum of Law, was
released by ODNI in November 2013.175,176 The date of issuance of the
Opinion is redacted, but it could well be the January 2007 certifications
noted by Attorney General Gonzales above.

Civil Society Engagement

The 2013 release of the declassified 2011 FISC Opinion (above) marks
the first time the government had disclosed a FISA court opinion in response
to a Freedom of Information Act lawsuit, brought in 2012 by the Electronic
Frontier Foundation. EFF sued after Sen. Ron Wyden (D-Ore.), in July 2012,
got the Office of the Director of National Intelligence to acknowledge that the
NSA’s surveillance had at least once violated the Constitution.177 Staff
Attorney Mark Rumold said, “It’s unfortunate it took a year of litigation and
the most significant leak in American history to finally get them to release
this opinion but I’m happy that the administration is beginning to take this
debate seriously.”178
ACLU submitted a FOIA request for the Government Memorandum of
Law179 (see above) submitted to the FISC on May 23, 2006, by AG Alberto
Gonzales, Steven G. Bradbury, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Office of
Legal Counsel, and James Baker, Counsel for Intelligence Policy. ACLU
received the document180 on November 18, 2013. Civil liberties
organizations also engaged in analysis181 of what was known/learned about
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the Program. As it was conducted entirely in secret until exposed - partially
in 2009 and more fully in 2013 - there was little opportunity for advocacy
other than reports and statements to congressional committees.
What Is Occurring Now?

This program is now incorporated into Section 702 of the 2008 FISA
Amendments Act.
Section 702, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Amendments Act
In 2008, Congress struck Section 702 of the FISA and replaced it with
a new Section 702 created in Public Law 110-261, the 2008 FISA
Amendments Act.182,183 This version essentially codifies the President’s
Surveillance Program: It permits the bulk collection - from American
companies - of Americans’ overseas communications (telephone calls and email, including the associated metadata) as long as the government is
targeting foreigners abroad.184 The section says surveillance may be
authorized by the Attorney General and Director of National Intelligence
without prior approval by the FISC, as long as minimization requirements
and general procedures blessed by the court are followed. Rather than
approving each target individually, the court simply approves annual
“certifications” allowing the targeting of broad categories of people. It is,
though, NSA agents who decide which particular phone lines and email
accounts will be wiretapped, and there is no explicit requirement that these

Published by SJSU ScholarWorks, 2018

51

Secrecy and Society, Vol. 2, No. 1 [2018], Art. 2

particular phones and email addresses be foreign - only the program’s
overall target must be.185
Although the targets of the eavesdropping have to be “reasonably
believed” to be outside the United States, as former Deputy Attorney
General David Kris explains in his book on the law,186 the “target” of a
surveillance program under FAA is typically just the foreign group - such as
Al Qaeda or Wikileaks - that the government is seeking information about187:
[The FAA’s] certification provision states that the government under
Section 1881a is “not required to identify the specific facilities, places
premises, or property at which an acquisition … will be directed or
conducted.” This is a significant grant of authority, because it allows
for authorized acquisition - surveillance or a search - directed at any
facility or location. For example, an authorization targeting “al Qaeda”
- which is a non-U.S. person located abroad—could allow the
government to wiretap any telephone that it believes will yield
information from or about al Qaeda, either because the telephone is
registered to a person whom the government believes is affiliated with
al Qaeda, or because the government believes that the person
communicates with others who are affiliated with al Qaeda, regardless
of the location of the telephone. … Review of the certification is limited
to the question “whether [it] contains all the required elements”; the
FISC does not look behind the government’s assertions. Thus, for
example, the FISC could not second-guess the government’s foreign
intelligence purpose of conducting the acquisition, as long as the
certification in fact asserts such a purpose [emphasis added].188
Indeed, in a 2011 FISC Opinion - noted earlier and discussed in detail
below - Judge John D. Bates found that the agency had violated the
Constitution and noted serial misrepresentations to the Court.189
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NSA Systemic Overcollection of Domestic Communications
On April 15, 2009, as a result of a disclosure from a non-identified
source, the New York Times reported that the NSA is involved in “significant
and systemic” overcollection of domestic communications.190
The overcollection problems appear to have been uncovered as part of
a twice-annual certification that the Justice Department and the
director of national intelligence are required to give to the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court on the protocols that the N.S.A. is using
in wiretapping. That review, which according to officials began in the
waning days of the Bush administration and was continued by the
Obama administration, led intelligence officials to realize that the NSA
was improperly capturing information involving significant amounts of
American traffic.
Notified of the problems by the N.S.A., officials with both the House
and Senate intelligence committees said they had concerns that the
agency had ignored civil liberties safeguards built into last year’s
wiretapping law.191
And yet, as will be discussed below, officials with both the House and
Senate intelligence committees reauthorized the legislation on January 11,
2018, without added protections for civil liberties.
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What We Learned as a Result the Snowden Documents

192

Figure: Two Programs - PRISM and Upstream - Authorized By Section 702.

The PRISM program allows the NSA to receive data directly from the
servers of U.S. companies like Microsoft, Yahoo, Skype, Google, and
Facebook, and thus collect the contents of foreign targets' emails, text and
video chats, photographs, and more.
The Upstream program was pointed to in the declassified Inspectors
General Report and in a December 23, 2005, New York Times story, in which
James Risen and Eric Lichtblau revealed that the NSA had been capturing
American communications on a much broader scale by "tapping directly into
some of the American telecommunication systems.”193 The program is
discussed in detail below.
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Declassified October 13, 2011, Opinion of FISC Judge John D. Bates
A 2011 Opinion (noted above) was released along with several others
related to the collection program approved by Congress in 2008 under
Section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act.194,195 In the ruling, Judge Bates
found that the agency had violated the Constitution and he noted serial
misrepresentations to the Court196:
The court is troubled that the government’s revelations regarding
N.S.A.’s acquisition of Internet transactions197 mark the third instance
in less than three years in which the government has disclosed a
substantial misrepresentation regarding the scope of a major collection
program.
For the first time, the government has now advised the court that the
volume and nature of the information it has been collecting is
fundamentally different from what the court had been led to believe.198
Through Upstream, the NSA amasses a database of hundreds of
millions of Americans’ phone-call records: numbers dialed and the time and
duration of calls (i.e., metadata), but no content. Bates continued: “Contrary
to the government’s repeated assurances, NSA had been routinely running
queries of the metadata using querying terms that did not meet the required
standard.” The Court concluded that this requirement had been “so
frequently and systematically violated that it can fairly be said that this
critical element of the overall. . .regime has never functioned effectively.”199
Judge Bates further noted that the collection of purely domestic
communications (Upstream) is likely to continue.
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•

NSA collected tens of thousands of wholly domestic communications:
According to the opinion, the NSA, for several years, “has acquired, is
acquiring, and if the certifications and procedures now before the
Court is approved, will continue to acquire, unlawfully gathered tens of
thousands of e-mails and other electronic communications between
Americans as part of a now-revised collection method (see 2007 DOJ
announcement and subsequent Memorandum discussed earlier). Based
on NSA numbers the Court estimated that the spy agency may have
been collecting as many as 56,000 “wholly domestic” communications
each year.200
Senator Ron Wyden, in a statement on August 21, 2013, said “The
FISA Court has noted that this collection violates the spirit of the law
but the government has failed to address this concern in the two years
since this ruling was issued.201 This ruling makes it clear that FISA
Section 702, as written, is insufficient to adequately protect the civil
liberties and privacy rights of law-abiding Americans and should be
reformed.”202

•

Upstream Collection Communications may contain entire Internet
"Transactions” not related to the target and diverted into a repository:
Bates further noted that it was not until 2011 (the amended Section
702 was approved in 2008) that the NSA told the court that its
“upstream” collection of Internet communications may contain entire
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Internet “transactions” not related to the target (even as vaguely
described the “target” might be) (reported by The Washington Post
and others).203,204 In June 2011, the NSA informed Bates that an
Internet transaction may be a single communication, or it may include
“multiple discrete communications,” including those that are not to,
from, or about a target. “That revelation fundamentally alters the
Court’s understanding of the scope of the collection conducted
pursuant to Section 702,” Bates said [emphasis added].205
Judge Bates’ opinion also noted that under the NSA’s “upstream”
collection, the NSA diverted international data passing through fiberoptic cables in the United States into a repository where the material
could be stored temporarily for processing, and for the selection of
foreign communications, rather than domestic ones. According to a
press conference call on the newly declassified court opinion, the
Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) said that it was
"technologically impossible to" filter out the “wholly domestic”
communications between Americans.206
According to a report about a conference call (about the
declassification and release of the ruling), an IC official indicated that
the FISA Court paused the program (discussed below) but said,
If you have a webmail email account, like Gmail or Hotmail, you know
that if you open up your email program, you will get a screenshot of
some number of emails that are sitting in your inbox. Those are all
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transmitted across the internet as one communication. For
technological reasons, the NSA was not capable of breaking those
down, and still is not capable, of breaking those down into their
individual [email] components.207
If one of those emails contained a reference to a foreign person
believed to be outside the U.S. - in the subject line, the sender or the
recipient, for instance - then the NSA would collect the entire
screenshot "that's popping up on your screen at the time. On occasion,
some of those [emails] might prove to be wholly domestic." If a
foreign person being targeted is in contact with an American, "you can
get all that U.S. person's screenshot" from his or her inbox.208
The official also noted, “The court found the NSA's procedures for
purging wholly domestic communications needed to be beefed up, and
that's what was done."209
•

Collection paused - then restarted: In the Opinion, Judge Bates
ordered the collection to stop until the NSA could propose an
acceptable remedy. In November 2011, Bates signed an order
approving the fix, which included a new technical means to segregate
transactions most likely [emphasis added] to contain U.S. persons’
communications, and reducing the retention period from five to two
years. As discussed below, in April 2012 the NSA decided to conduct a
purge of all upstream data collected since Section 702’s inception in
2008.
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•

Approved certification of targets: As a result of Snowden releases, we
learned that in July 2008, the court approved the first two
certifications for “counterterrorism” and “foreign government”
targets.210 In March 2009, the court approved a third certification for
targets engaged in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.211
On their faces, these approvals seem unsurprising, but recall the
explanation from former Deputy Attorney General David Kris about
what the certification provision entails:
[The FAA’s] certification provision states that the government under
Section 1881a is “not required to identify the specific facilities, places,
premises, or property at which an acquisition … will be directed or
conducted.” This is a significant grant of authority, because it allows
for authorized acquisition—surveillance or a search—directed at any
facility or location. For example, an authorization targeting “al
Qaeda”—which is a non-U.S. person located abroad—could allow the
government to wiretap any telephone that it believes will yield
information from or about al Qaeda, either because the telephone is
registered to a person whom the government believes is affiliated with
al Qaeda, or because the government believes that the person
communicates with others who are affiliated with al Qaeda, regardless
of the location of the telephone. … Review of the certification is limited
to the question “whether [it] contains all the required elements”; the
FISC does not look behind the government’s assertions. Thus, for
example, the FISC could not second-guess the government’s foreign
intelligence purpose of conducting the acquisition, as long as the
certification in fact asserts such a purpose [emphasis added].212
This practice was codified in the 2012 reauthorization of the Act.213

What Has Occurred since the FISC Rulings?214
•

NSA Halts Collection of Americans’ Emails “About” Foreign Targets: On
April 28, 2017, the NSA said it had halted collecting Americans’ emails
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and texts exchanged with people overseas that simply mention
identifying terms- like email addresses - for foreigners on whom the
agency is spying, but are neither to nor from those targets. NSA
analysts are still, however, permitted to search for an American’s
information within another repository of emails gathered through the
warrantless surveillance program’s PRISM or “downstream” system,
which gathers emails of foreign targets from providers like Gmail and
Yahoo Mail. That system does not collect “about” communications. As
noted below, the ruling from the FISC presiding judge, Judge
Rosemary M. Collyer, subsequently authorized215 the agency to use
Americans’ identifiers to query the newly captured [emphasis added]
upstream internet messages for future intelligence investigations.
•

NSA Conducts Purge of All Upstream Collected 2008–2012: In April
2012, the NSA decided to conduct a purge of all upstream data
collected since Section 702’s inception in 2008, senior intelligence
officials said.216 They could not estimate the quantity, but one official
said it was “lots.” According to another official: “It would have been
everything.”217 But they have continued to collect upstream data.

•

“Backdoor Search Loophole” authorized by FISC: An NSA official said
the FISC’s presiding judge, Judge Rosemary M. Collyer, authorized218
the agency to use Americans’ identifiers to query the newly captured
[emphasis added] upstream internet messages for future intelligence
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investigations. Once collected through PRISM, the communications of
Americans are put into databases that are routinely searched by the
FBI when starting - or even before officially starting - investigations
into domestic crimes that may ultimately have nothing to do with
foreign intelligence issues. With Judge Collyer’s authorization, the
government is now allowed to conduct these searches on
communications collected as part of its “upstream” collection as well.
In April 2017, the NSA issued a Statement indicating that:
After considerable evaluation of the program and available technology,
NSA has decided that its Section 702 foreign intelligence surveillance
activities will no longer include any upstream internet communications
that are solely "about" a foreign intelligence target. Instead, this
surveillance will now be limited to only those communications that are
directly "to" or "from" a foreign intelligence target. These changes are
designed to retain the upstream collection that provides the greatest
value to national security while reducing the likelihood that NSA will
acquire communications of U.S. persons or others who are not in
direct contact with one of the Agency's foreign intelligence targets.
In addition, as part of this curtailment, NSA will delete the vast
majority of previously acquired upstream internet communications as
soon as practicable.219

Privacy and Civil Liberties Concerns about Backdoor Search
The concern for privacy advocates and civil libertarians is that the
government (in particular, the FBI) is permitted to seek out the content of
Americans’ communications that have been swept up through Section 702
without any suspicion of wrongdoing, let alone a warrant. Civil liberties and
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privacy advocates call this the “backdoor search loophole” and have wanted
Congress to require the government to obtain a warrant to search for
Americans’ incidentally collected information within the warrantless
surveillance repository.
Senator Ron Wyden, in particular, has been dogged in pushing the
Director of National Intelligence (DNI) for transparency about an estimate of
the number of Americans whose communications have been collected under
Section 702.220 Members of the House have also weighed in strongly.221 DNI
Coats, at his February 28, 2017 confirmation hearing, told Senator Wyden
(and the Committee) that “I’m going to do everything I can to work with
Admiral Rogers in NSA to get you that number.” In June, Director Coats said
providing the number is “infeasible.”222
Civil Society Engagement

In 2008, the EFF filed a lawsuit, Jewel v. National Security Agency,
challenging “upstream” surveillance (as well as other bulk collection
activities) on behalf of AT&T customers whose communications and
telephone records were collected by the NSA.223 In 2016, the district court
rejected the plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment arguments, but has not issued a
ruling on their First Amendment claims, and the case is (as of this writing) in
discovery.224
In addition to suing the government agencies involved in the domestic
dragnet, Jewel v. NSA also targets the individuals responsible for creating
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authorizing and implementing the illegal program including DIRNSA Keith
Alexander and former Vice President Dick Cheney, Cheney’s former chief of
staff David Addington, former Attorney General and White House Counsel
Alberto Gonzales, and other individuals who ordered or participated in the
warrantless domestic surveillance.225

The Obama Administration Moves to Dismiss the Case

The Obama administration moved to dismiss Jewel in 2009, claiming
that litigation over the wiretapping program would require the government
to disclose privileged “state secrets,” and that it was immune from suit. The
court instead ruled that the case should be dismissed on standing
grounds. In December of 2011, the 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals ruled
that Plaintiffs’ allegations were sufficient to provide standing and Jewel could
proceed in district court.
In July 2012, EFF moved to have the court declare that the FISA law
applies instead of the state secrets privilege; in September 2012, the
government renewed its "state secrets" claims, and the matter was heard by
the federal district court in San Francisco on December 14, 2012. In July
2013, the court rejected the government’s “state secrets” argument, ruling
that any properly classified details can be litigated under the procedures of
FISA.226 The court did dismiss some of EFF’s statutory claims, but the other
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claims, including that the program violates the First Amendment of the
Constitution, continue.227

A Challenge to "Upstream" Surveillance of Online Communications

In addition, Wikimedia, PEN American Center, and The Nation, among
other organizations, filed a lawsuit challenging “upstream” surveillance of
online communications, raising both First Amendment and Fourth
Amendment arguments.228 The Wikimedia plaintiffs claim that upstream
surveillance impedes their journalism, advocacy, and publishing activities.
The district court ruled against Wikimedia in 2015, and an appeal is pending
before the Fourth Circuit.229 The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the
Press filed an amicus brief in that case on behalf of itself and 17 news media
organizations, arguing that upstream surveillance chills newsgathering and
violates the First and Fourth Amendments.230
The EFF filed a FOIA request in 2016 for FISC opinions related to
Section 702. On June 13, 2017, the FISA Court released 18 redacted
opinions regarding FISA Section 702.231,232 Mark Rumold of EFF notes that
The opinions show that, almost from the outset of the law in 2008, the
intelligence community has overstepped the court-imposed legal
restrictions on the operation of the surveillance. Most of the
documents tell a story of the IC overstepping boundaries, getting
reprimanded by the FISC, but nevertheless being allowed to continue
and even expand surveillance under the law.233
Additionally, organizations have repeatedly challenged the
constitutional and statutory basis of bulk surveillance. Civil society
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organizations have actively worked to inform and educate Congress and the
public about the issues and what should be done: commentaries, letters, and
organization testimony by civil society are here.234 A number of these relate
specifically to the expected reauthorization of the legislation in 2017 (see
below).

USA Freedom Act
I go into some detail here as, before the FISA Amendment Act
Reauthorization, these were the latest commitments made by the
Intelligence Community.235 They were only imposed with the IC’s tacit
consent, but give a clear sense of the known end-runs and violations
perpetrated by the IC since the passage of the USA PATRIOT Act in 2001 and are focused on those publicly known violations. Indeed, the full name of
the Act is “Uniting and Strengthening America by Fulfilling Rights and Ending
Eavesdropping, Dragnet-Collection and Online Monitoring Act.” It is quite
specific in its requirements and prohibitions (as opposed to the 2017
Reauthorization discussed below).

Title I
Title I bans the extant system of bulk collection under Section 215 of
the PATRIOT Act.
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•

Additionally, it stipulates that for call detail records, for pen registers
and trap-and-trace, and for the FBI to issue the bulk collection of
national security letters, the government must base the applications
on a “specific selection term” - a term that “specifically identifies a
person, account, address, or personal device” in a way that “limit[s],
to the greatest extent reasonably practicable, the scope of tangible
things sought consistent with the purpose for seeking the tangible
things.”

•

In regard to hops, the government can apply for records within the
first hop of the specific selection term if it (1) states “reasonable
grounds to believe that the call detail records sought to be produced
based on [a] specific selection term ... are relevant to [an authorized]
investigation,” and (2) has “a reasonable, articulable suspicion” that
the selection term is “associated with a foreign power engaged in
international terrorism or activities in preparation therefor, or an agent
of a foreign power engaged in international terrorism or activities in
preparation therefor.” To apply for records within the second hop, the
government must state “session-identifying information or a telephone
calling card number identified by the specific selection term” used to
produce call detail records within the first hop.

•

To safeguard against overbroad collection, the government must
“adopt minimization procedures” calling for “the prompt destruction of
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all call detail records” determined not to be “foreign intelligence
information.” FISA court judges may, moreover, “impose additional,
particularized minimization procedures” with respect to any
“nonpublicly available information concerning unconsenting United
States person.”

Title III
Title III prohibits the use, in court proceedings, of information
obtained under Section 702 through procedures deemed by a FISA Court to
be “deficient concerning any United States person.” Nor may the
government “use...or disclose...in any other manner” such information.
The law also addresses reform of the FISA Court. It provides for the
appointment of amici curiae to assist the FISA Court, who may provide
assistance with respect to “legal arguments or information regarding any …
area relevant to the issue presented to the court,” but only if the FISA Court
deems such information relevant and only in certain matters that “present a
novel or significant interpretation of the law” in the eyes of the FISA Court
[emphasis added]. It also provides for limited appellate review of FISA Court
decisions, as well as limited Supreme Court review of FISA Court of Review
decisions.
The law requires the DNI to perform declassification review [emphasis
added] of FISA Court opinions that “include...a significant construction or
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interpretation” of any provision of law and, following such declassification
review, make certain parts of FISA Court opinion publicly available.236

Title VI
Title VI prescribes extensive disclosure requirements with respect to
data about FISA collection, in particular, under Sections 601 and 602, the
government must disclose to Congress, as well as to the public, various
items regarding the number of orders and certifications sought and received;
estimates of the number of people targeted and affected by surveillance;
and the number of appointments of amici curiae, among other items of
information [emphasis added].
As noted earlier, USAF reinstates three provisions of the USA PATRIOT
Act, which expired on June 1: roving wiretaps of terror suspects who change
devices, surveillance of "lone wolf" suspects who are not affiliated with a
terrorist organization, and the seeking of court orders to search business
records.
As noted above, this law has the Intelligence Community’s tacit
imprimatur, so the limitations the law imposes should be read with an ear
toward how they are likely to be interpreted.237 What appear to be
substantive interpretations appear in the reauthorization of the FISA
Amendment Act below.
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Civil Society Engagement

Civil society letters and testimony to Congress, from 2014 to 2015, on
the USA FREEDOM Act are here.238 As noted above, Title IV of the USA
Freedom Act requires the DNI to perform declassification review of FISA
Court opinions that “include...a significant construction or interpretation” of
any provision of law and, following such declassification review, make
certain parts of FISA Court opinion publicly available. In October 2016, the
ACLU and Yale Law School’s Media Freedom and Information Access (MFIA)
filed a third motion seeking the release of all FISC opinions containing “novel
or significant interpretations” of law issued between 9/11 and the passage of
the USA Freedom Act in June 2015.239

FISA Amendment Act Reauthorization
The FISA Amendment Act was reauthorized in 2012 for five years.
•

Lead Up to 2017 Reauthorization: The FISA Amendment Act was
scheduled to expire on December 31, 2017. The intent of some
segments of Congress was to reauthorize with no changes. Among
some Members (including Senators and Representatives) and among
civil society, an effort was made to reform the Act (the final iteration
of this effort was the USA RIGHTS Act240). Specifically, the battle was
over the NSA’s “incidental” eavesdropping on Americans via its
warrantless surveillance program, Upstream and the authorization for
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the FBI to seek this data without a warrant. As discussed above,
privacy and civil liberties advocates wanted this “backdoor search
loophole” closed. They consider it a violation of the Fourth
Amendment.
•

What Happened in the Reauthorization? The Brennan Center for Justice
made available in the days leading up to the votes on reauthorization a
table241 outlining the key issues (from the civil liberties and privacy
perspectives, in italics). The key points of comparison of the USA
RIGHTS Amendment” and the FISA Reauthorization Amendments Act
(S.139)242 are below. The discussion of S. 139 also draws on the
Center for Democracy and Technology (CDT) analysis of what the final
bill contains.243

•

Prohibition of “about” collection (collecting communications not just to
or from foreign targets, but also communications that merely
reference them):
USA RIGHTS Amendment would have clarified that the government
may not collect communications that are not to or from the target of
surveillance.
S. 139 codifies a permissive process for resuming “about” collection,
where the NSA searches the content of communications for a targeted
email address, phone number or other selector.
As discussed earlier, “about” collection was not legislatively
authorized, rather it was carried out under certifications from the FISC
- although for a number of years it was not clear to the Court that
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these collections were contained in the declarations made in the
requests for certification. Upon understanding that “about” collection is
more likely to return communications that are wholly unrelated to a
“target” and purely domestic, the FISA Court instituted special privacy
rules governing its use. When the NSA was unable to follow those
rules, the practice stopped, with the possibility of resuming after court
approval later.244 The bill simply codified existing practice - if the NSA
gets its compliance act together and the FISA Court signs off, the
“about” program may start again. The bill adds a 30-day notice
requirement to Congress so it may intervene and theoretically prevent
its resumption.
The administration was set to obtain its next annual court order in late
April 2018, which is a logical restart point if the technical issues are
resolved.
•

Protection of Americans’ privacy by requiring a warrant to access
Americans’ phone calls and e-mails:
S.139 authorizes such warrantless searches - a practice that was not
previously expressly authorized in law - except in “predicated criminal
investigations” unrelated to national security or foreign intelligence. A
“predicated” investigation is one that has reached a certain stage of
fact-finding.
The government remains free under S. 139 to conduct warrantless
searches during the earlier phases of the investigation - which is when
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backdoor searches routinely occur, according to the Privacy and Civil
Liberties Oversight Board. In practice, a warrant would almost never
be necessary, as the FBI itself has acknowledged. It has explained that
it regularly searches its 702 databases with Americans’ identifiers,
looking for their communications only on the basis of a tip and long
before formal investigations are opened.245
USA RIGHTS Amendment would have required the government to
obtain a warrant before querying Section 702 data to obtain
Americans’ communications, with narrow exceptions—including an
emergency exception that allows the government to proceed without a
warrant if someone’s life or safety is in danger (for instance, a
kidnapping situation).
•

Prohibition on the government from collecting wholly domestic
communications (namely, those with Americans on both ends of the
call or e-mail) under Section 702:
S.139 does nothing to halt this practice.
Recent exchanges between Senator Wyden and intelligence officials
strongly suggest that the government is knowingly collecting wholly
domestic communications under Section 702.246
USA RIGHTS Amendment would have clarified that the government
may not acquire communications it knows to be wholly domestic under
Section 702.

•

Meaningful limitation on the ways in which Section 702
communications can be used against Americans:
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S. 139 contains no limits on the use of Americans’ communications in
investigations, or in legal proceedings other than criminal prosecutions
(such as immigration actions). It also allows the use of Americans’
communications as evidence in criminal cases if the Attorney General
makes a determination - which cannot be challenged or reviewed by
any court - that the case relates to or affects national security, or that
it involves death, kidnapping, serious bodily injury, specified offenses
against minors, critical infrastructure, cybersecurity, transnational
crime, or human trafficking.247
USA RIGHTS Amendment would have limited the use of Americans’
communications to cases involving terrorism, espionage, WMDs,
cybersecurity threats, critical infrastructure, and threats against U.S.
or allied armed forces, and prevent the use of warrantless access to
evidence against Americans in ordinary criminal cases.
•

Ensure that people will be notified if the government uses Section 702derived information against them in domestic legal proceedings; allow
Americans who have reason to think their communications were
obtained under Section 702 to challenge the surveillance248:
S.139, Section 111 requires the Attorney General to brief the
Intelligence and Judiciary Committees on whether and how the
Department of Justice notifies people that 702 information and other
information collected under FISA authorities is used against them in
official proceedings. This includes the introduction of 702 evidence in a
criminal prosecution - but also in all trials, hearings, and proceedings,
conducted by any “court, department, officer, agency, regulatory
body.” The notice requirements extend to any “aggrieved person”
which includes Americans and non-citizens, as well as targets of
surveillance and those who communicate with a target.
The briefing required in Section 111 is critical, because the
government has refused to explain how information derived from 702
surveillance is used to build cases, or is used to collect the same or
similar information through other surveillance authorities, and thus
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obscure the source of the information - known as “parallel
construction.” Regrettably, none of this has to be memorialized in
writing, and none of it has to be made public.
USA RIGHTS Amendment would have clarified that the government
must notify parties to legal proceedings when it uses information
against them that it would not have acquired without Section 702
surveillance.
Also, codification in S. 139 of a definition of “about” collection (see
above) effectively removed any prospect of a statutory challenge
based on a claim that “about” collection was not authorized by
Congress.249
USA RIGHTS Amendment would have clarified that someone has been
“injured” by Section 702 surveillance, for purposes of bringing allowed
to bring a court challenge, if they reasonably believe their
communications have been collected and if they have taken objectively
reasonable steps to avoid the surveillance.
•

Number of known U.S. Persons for whom the FBI Searches/Number of
queries FBI conducts:
S.139, Section 112 requires the Justice Department Inspector General
(IG) to audit the process by which the FBI queries U.S. person
information and uses it. The audit will include how the FBI handles
searches for people whose nationality is not known, how the FBI
ensures compliance with its internal querying procedures, and how the
FBI uses queries in foreign intelligence investigations or criminal
assessments. It also directs the IG to examine what is preventing the
FBI from estimating the number of queries it conducts or the known
U.S. persons for which it searches.
The FBI has declined, thus far, to track this number.250
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Some Whistleblower Protections

Additionally, Section 110 extends some whistleblower protections to IC
contractor employees - about one-fourth of the IC workforce - the same
incentives and protections as employees to blow the whistle on waste, fraud,
or abuse without fear of retaliation. Employees have protection
under President Obama’s 2012 Presidential Policy Directive 19, Part A.251
Under Section 110, contract employees are now protected to report
wrongdoing, but enforcement mechanisms against retaliation are lacking in
the bill itself: “The President shall provide for the enforcement of this
subsection.”

Civil Society Engagement

Since early 2016, civil society organizations have been writing letters
to Congress, providing testimony, and posting commentaries252 on the issues
with Section 702 and how/why it needed - and needs - to be reformed

Issues with Congressional Oversight
It is obvious that something is deeply amiss with congressional
oversight of the IC and its activities. This failure of robust oversight is
critical, especially as the Administration White Paper claimed that the
Section 215 bulk collection is legal, in large part because Congress twice (as
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of August 2013) extended the PATRIOT Act without changing the terms of
Section 215:
Moreover, information concerning the use of Section 215 to collect
telephony metadata in bulk was made available to all Members of
Congress, and Congress reauthorized Section 215 without change after
this information was provided. It is significant to the legal analysis of
the statute that Congress was on notice of this activity and of the
source of its legal authority when the statute was reauthorized.253
A key part of the argument that the use of Section 215 is legal rests
on the Administration’s claim that it gave notice to Congress about the
expansion of the program. It is (sort of) hard to know whether to be as
cynical about this issue as the authors of a Lawfare blog,
Many members of Congress have spent the last few months appearing
shocked by information leaked about the NSA’s surveillance
programs. The documents released yesterday, however, make clear
that any member of Congress who did not know what was going on
with respect to Section 702 surveillance did not choose to know including with regard to the government’s 2011 setback before the
FISA Court.254
Or, to believe the avowals of lack of knowledge by some members of
Congress.255

Limited Congressional Access to Intelligence Briefings

It is hard to argue, however, that Congress has not caved to the
demands of the executive branch that only a very small handful of Members
(Senators and Representatives) be allowed in on secret briefings to read
secret documents - without members of their staffs who are experts on
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these laws and might be able to ask challenging questions. The Members
cannot take notes and cannot speak of what they read or heard. Rather than
conduct oversight, the Congress has accepted the secret assurances of
secret agencies about deeply secret programs, and has amended the law to
expand the authority of the executive well beyond what even the USA
PATRIOT Act did, at least up to the USA Freedom Act in 2015.
The New York Times reported on December 16, 2005, that after “the
special program” started, congressional leaders from both political parties,
including the chairmen and ranking members of the Senate and House
intelligence committees, were brought to Vice President Dick Cheney's office
in the White House.256,257 The article noted that it was not clear how much
the members of Congress were told about the presidential order and the
eavesdropping program. Some of them declined to comment about the
matter, while others did not return phone calls. Later briefings were held for
members of Congress as they assumed leadership roles on the intelligence
committees, officials familiar with the program said.

Senator Rockefeller's Concerns regarding Expanded Surveillance

After a July 2003 briefing, Senator Rockefeller, the West Virginia
Democrat who became vice chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee
that year, sent a hand-written letter to Mr. Cheney expressing concerns
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about the program.258 On December 20, 2005, The Washington Post wrote
that
what he heard alarmed him so much that immediately afterward he
wrote two identical letters, by hand, expressing his concerns. He sent
one to Vice President Cheney and placed the other - as he pointedly
warned Cheney he would - in a safe in case anyone in the future might
challenge his version of what happened. Rockefeller proved prophetic.
Yesterday the 21-year Senate veteran from West Virginia released his
copy of the letter - which when written, was so sensitive he dared not
allow a staffer to read it, let alone type it.
In eight sentences on two sheets of Senate letterhead, Rockefeller
wrote obliquely of "the sensitive intelligence issues we discussed
today." Yesterday, after confirming with White House officials that the
letter contains no classified information, the senator said the briefing's
topic was the National Security Agency's expanded surveillance of
Americans, publicly disclosed last week by the New York Times and
now at the center of a political furor.259
There also has appeared to be a difference in how availability of
information about the programs has been handled recently in the Senate
and the House.260 In 2013, according to The Washington Post,
a declassified document - cited repeatedly by both Administration
officials and congressional leaders as assurance of meaningful
congressional oversight of the bulk collection of domestic telephone
data - was withheld from circulation by the House Intelligence
Committee. A cover letter to the House and Senate intelligence
committees asked the leaders of each panel to share the written
material with all members of Congress. The Senate Intelligence
Committee did so. The House Committee opted, instead, to invite all
435 House members to attend classified briefings where the program
was discussed - briefings that critics say were vague and
uninformative. Justin Amash, the Michigan Republican who led the
effort to defund the NSA's mass phone-records collection, said
confronting intelligence officials during the briefings was “like a game
of 20 questions,” and added: “If you don’t know about the program,
you don’t know what to ask about.”261
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•

The Intelligence Committees and E.O. 12333: The National Security
Act of 1947 requires that Congress be kept “fully and currently
informed” about “significant” intelligence activities. Congress has
arguably not been kept so informed, even though E.O.12333 activities
are certainly “significant.” The problem, legal experts and lawmakers
have said, is that only the executive branch - and the intelligence
agencies that are part of it - determines what “fully and currently
informed” means and what details it needs to share with Congress.
As reported in a 2013 article, House Intelligence Committee
member262 Adam Schiff, D-CA, noted, “There’s no clear definition. We
need to have a bigger discussion of what our mutual understanding is
of what we want to be informed of.”263
The article also notes that Senator Dianne Feinstein, D-CA, who then
chaired the Senate Intelligence Committee, has consistently defended
the NSA’s collection of domestic cellphone metadata, saying the
program under which it is doing so is overseen by both the courts and
Congress. At the time, she called for a broad review of what’s taking
place under 12333, noting that the order authorizes phone and email
metadata collection beyond what FISA does. However, she also has
said: “The other programs [the 12333 programs] do not (have the
same oversight as FISA). And that’s what we need to take a look
at.”264 She indicated that her committee [Senate Select Committee on
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Intelligence] has not been able to “sufficiently” oversee the programs
run under the executive order: “Twelve-triple-three programs are
under the executive branch entirely.”265
•

Recent Efforts within Congress: On March 22, 2016, eight members of
the House Intelligence Committee sent a letter to the Chair and
Ranking Member of the House Appropriations Committee, requesting
adequate funding to the House Office of the Sergeant at Arms to
support Top Secret Sensitive Compartmented Information Security
(TS/SCI) Clearance investigations for individual designees from each
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence Member's personal
staff to support their Member for hearings and markups.266 They
noted:
The lack of funding places an onerous burden on individual Members,
as they are unable to have the assistance of staff at the most crucial
times, and is a major oversight considering their counterparts on the
U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence are afforded SCI
Clearance investigations for personal office designees.267
The House Intelligence Committee and its Senate counterpart were
intended to consolidate review of intelligence matters, inform the
entire Congress of intelligence activities, and hold public hearings to
inform the broader public.
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Civil Society Engagement

In September 2016, 33 organizations across the political spectrum
sent a letter to Speaker of the House Paul Ryan and Democratic Leader
Nancy Pelosi, urging them to adopt reforms to modernize the House’s
intelligence oversight in order to provide a meaningful check on the
Executive Branch and reform how it conducts oversight over intelligence
matters.268
The letter also urged them to consider establishing a distinct, broadbased review of the activities of the IC since 9/11, modeled after the 9/11
Commission or the U.S. Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental
Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities. As the letter notes, when
questions were raised about the activities of the intelligence community in
the 1970s,
Congress reacted by forming two special committees, colloquially
known as the Pike and Church committees. Reports preceded
wholesale reforms of the intelligence community, including improving
congressional-oversight mechanisms.269 The outcome improved
congressional oversight and the perception of its efficacy. The House
should provide the new select committee adequate staffing and
financial support, and give it a broad mandate to review practices and
structures associated with congressional oversight of intelligence
matters.270
The academic non-government community has also contributed
analysis, commentary, and recommendations for remediation. A few of the
contributions include those from Heidi Kitrosser271 and Kathleen Clark.272
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Funneling Requirements and the Separation of Powers

Kitrosser’s article on information funnels in the sharing of executive
branch information with Congress identifies key questions over whether
funneling requirements infringe on the separation of powers and thus need
not always be obeyed, what if anything should follow from information
funneling - whether, for example, those with whom information is shared
should be able to take some action in response to what they learn. Kitrosser
uses the recent controversy about warrantless surveillance by the NSA as a
jumping-off point to explore these questions, explains that Congress has the
constitutional authority to set information-sharing requirements between the
executive branch and itself, and suggests some answers to the questions as
to how information funneling requirements should work.
Clark’s article on Congress’ Right to Counsel notes that, for decades,
congressional leaders have acquiesced in the executive branch’s insistence
that certain intelligence information not be shared with congressional
staffers, even those staffers who have high-level security clearances. As a
result, Congress has been hobbled in its ability to understand and analyze
key executive branch programs. It puts this issue into the larger context of
Congress’s right to access national security–related information, discusses
congressional mechanisms for protecting the confidentiality of that
information, identifies several constitutional arguments for Congress’s right
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to share information with its lawyers and other expert staff, and explores
ways to achieve this reform.

Secrecy and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court and Opinions
The United States Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) was
established by Congress and authorized under the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act of 1978 or FISA.273 Only the Executive Branch can submit
requests. No one outside government can appear before the FISC judge
without specific invitation.274 Its rulings and its opinions are all secret.
The FISC started out (and has continued) as a secret court and, as Eric
Lichtblau has noted, has quietly become almost a parallel Supreme Court,
serving as the ultimate arbiter on surveillance issues and delivering opinions
that will most likely shape intelligence practices for years to come, according
to current and former officials familiar with the court’s classified decisions.275
The FISC, whose statutory role is to approve warrant applications for
surveillance activities related to national security, seems to have operated
for years prior to 9/11 in the manner Congress had intended. Recent
revelations raise significant questions about the conduct of the court.
Instead of approving warrant applications, FISA court judges are, as noted
earlier in regard to Section 215 orders, reviewing and approving bulk
collections and “programmatic surveillance.”
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The Extended Authority of the FISC
Perhaps the greatest change at the FISC is that judges are no longer
simply reviewing warrant applications for individual surveillance operations.
The authority of the Court has been extended since 2001. It now has the
authority to permit the electronic surveillance of entire categories—“without
the need for a court order for each individual target” - of non-USPs located
abroad.276 Under this provision, instead of issuing individual court orders,
the FISC approves annual certifications submitted by the Attorney General
and the DNI that identify categories of foreign intelligence targets.277 But
although the statutes passed by Congress are available to the public, how
those statutes have been interpreted and used remains secret.
Civil society (and others) talk about “capture,” most frequently
referring to the capture of regulatory agencies by outside (nongovernmental) “interests.” It is not inappropriate to talk about the FISC
being captured by the White House and the IC. As noted above, we have
seen some faint glimmerings of push-back (particularly in the House) in
Congress.

Some FISC Orders and Opinions Declassified in Response to FOIA
Litigation
On September 5, 2013, in a court filing278 responding to a judge’s
order - in response to EFF FOIA litigation - the Justice Department said that
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they would make public a host of material that will “total hundreds of pages”
by next week, including:
orders and opinions of the FISC issued from January 1, 2004, to June
6, 2011, that contain a significant legal interpretation of the
government’s authority or use of its authority under Section 215; and
responsive “significant documents, procedures, or legal analyses
incorporated into FISC opinions or orders and treated as binding by
the Department of Justice or the National Security Agency.”279
The U.S. government says it is “broadly construing” that order and is
declassifying a larger set of documents than the ruling requires.280 It
provided hundreds of pages of documents to the Electronic Frontier
Foundation in response to a lawsuit under the Freedom of Information
Act.281
Some Recommendations for Reform of FISC
The academic non-government community has also contributed
analysis, commentary, and recommendations for remediation in this area. A
few of the contributions include those from Emily Berman and Robert Stein,
Walter Mondale, and Caitlinrose Fisher.282,283
Berman’s article, The Two Faces of the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court, argues that after the Snowden disclosures, U.S.
surveillance activities were thrust to the forefront of public debate, including
questions about the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (“FISA Court”).
The discussion, however, has underemphasized a critical feature of the way
the FISA Court works: Not only its traditional role of “gatekeeper,” but also
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the additional - and entirely different - role of “rule maker.” Further, the
Article provides an assessment of the attempt to reform the FISA Court in
the recently enacted USA FREEDOM Act of 2015. She concludes that the Act
represents a missed opportunity: In not fully appreciating or accounting for
the unique challenges that the court’s rule-making function poses, the Act
does not nearly go far enough in bolstering the court’s rulemaking
competence. Moreover, she argues the Act neglects (as has the public
debate) a critical area for reform: ensuring sufficient flow of information
from the Executive Branch to the FISA Court. The article explores the nature
of this challenge and offers some additional reform ideas for consideration.
Stein, Mondale, and Fisher note that in the wake of 9/11, Congress
significantly altered FISA’s scheme, opening the door once again to
executive overreach. Due to the changes to FISA, the Executive Branch is
able to engage in practices similar to those that catalyzed the formation of
the Church Committee and the enactment of FISA. This article chronicles the
evolution of FISA and the FISA Court. Drawing on the unique perspective of
Vice President Mondale, the article analyzes the ways in which the post-9/11
Act and the Court are at odds with their original design.284 The article argues
that such overreach is possible in part because of structural changes to the
FISA Court and the executive branch’s invocation of the need for secrecy in
non-FISA Court proceedings. According to the authors, the recently enacted
USA FREEDOM Act fails to fix the structural issues that currently limit the
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authority and efficacy of the FISA Court. The FISA Court no longer serves its
intended function as a specialized Article III court of limited jurisdiction;
rather, it is more akin to an adjunct to the executive branch, lending
legitimacy to intelligence operations without practically limiting executive
authority. The article concludes by recommending tangible actions Congress
can and should take - structures and processes that limit executive authority
and comport with Article III of the United States Constitution.

Intelligence Community Transparency Since Snowden
The two epigraphs I included at the start of this article point to the
critical question that bookends it and is at its heart: Why would or should we
trust the Intelligence Community? Is there a true change of heart and mind
reflected in the second quote from Bob Litt, or is the first one the truth and
the second one public relations?
As I have laid out in the pages above, the White House, the
Department of Justice, and the NSA have repeatedly lied (at a minimum,
misdirected and “misrepresented”) to the FISC, to Congress, and - not leastto the American public. It is noteworthy that, since 2013, the NSA, the CIA,
and the ODNI have each created an Office of Civil Liberties, Privacy, and
Transparency, the heads and staffs of which are open, take their roles and
responsibilities seriously, and have shown themselves to be trustworthy. The
concerns expressed here are not intended to malign them or cast
aspersions.
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Members of the privacy, civil liberties, and government openness
communities have held “Chatham House Rule” meetings with these and
other representatives from ODNI and NSA on the issue of declassification of
FISC opinions and the government’s unwillingness to provide an index of any
sort of those opinions it declines to declassify and release.285
Members of these communities have also met with these and other
representatives from ODNI and the other intelligence agencies. Many of the
discussions focused on transparency about an estimate of the number of
Americans whose communications have been collected under Section 702.
Although the civil society participants have offered ideas - in particular
sampling - to counter the government’s claim that they would have to
invade the privacy of the individuals collected under 702, and that the
numbers make it impractical, the NSA continues to resist. As noted earlier,
DNI Coats has stated that this is “infeasible.”
The ODNI has put a very large amount of information up on two
sites.286 As noted in a February 2015 article, though, “Tens of thousands of
pages of records on those efforts have been made public, largely in response
to Freedom of Information Act requests and lawsuits.”287 As noted at the
beginning of this article, some of the postings since then seem voluntary.
In December 2017, the Chief of the ODNI Office of Civil Liberties,
Privacy and Transparency, notified various organizations that
in September 2017, his office posted a guide with links to certain
officially released documents related to the use by the Intelligence
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Community (IC) of national security authorities. These documents
have been published to meet legal requirements, as well as to carry
out the Principles of Intelligence Transparency for the IC.... We have
now updated that Guide288 to include links to additional officially
released documents. The updated links are annotated with an asterisk.
In addition to this Updated Guide, please note that the IC has
launched a new web portal, Intel.gov,289 which features the “Intel
Vault.” The Intel Vault290 enables users to conduct full-text searches of
the Section 702 documents posted on IC on the Record.291

Lack of Whistleblower Protections within the Intelligence
Community
There are some recent disturbing reports, however, reflecting on the
IC’s commitment to accountability. The first is a Daily Beast report on
February 11, 2018, noting that, according to an April 2017 finding (of an
inspection run out of the Intelligence Community Inspector General office),
the spy agencies - including the CIA and the NSA - were failing to protect
intelligence workers who report waste, fraud, abuse, or criminality up the
chain of command.292 The investigators working on the report looked into
190 cases of alleged reprisal in six agencies, and uncovered that “over and
over and over again, intelligence inspectors ruled that the agency was in the
right, and the whistleblowers were almost always wrong.” According to the
article, the report had been near completion but had been sequestered by
the acting head of the Intelligence Community Inspector General office,
Wayne Stone, following the discovery that one of the inspectors was himself
a whistleblower in the middle of a federal lawsuit against the CIA (for
retaliation for his own whistleblowing), according to former IC IG officials.
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Destruction of Presidential Surveillance Program Data
A second report, from Politico, is that, according to recent court filings,
the NSA destroyed surveillance data - Presidential Surveillance Program
Internet content data - it pledged to preserve in connection with pending
lawsuits, and apparently never took some of the steps it told a federal court
it had taken to make sure the information wasn’t destroyed293:
Since 2007, the NSA has been under court orders to preserve data
about certain of its surveillance efforts that came under legal attack
following disclosures that President George W. Bush ordered
warrantless wiretapping of international communications after the
2001 terrorist attacks on the U.S. In addition, the agency has made a
series of representations in court over the years about how it is
complying with its duties.
However, the NSA told U.S. District Court Judge Jeffrey White in a
filing on Thursday night and another little-noticed submission last year
that the agency did not preserve the content of internet
communications intercepted between 2001 and 2007 under the
program Bush ordered. To make matters worse, backup tapes that
might have mitigated the failure were erased in 2009, 2011 and 2016,
the NSA said.
“The NSA sincerely regrets its failure to prevent the deletion of this
data,” NSA’s deputy director of capabilities, identified publicly as
“Elizabeth B.,” wrote in a declaration filed in October. “NSA senior
management is fully aware of this failure, and the Agency is
committed to taking swift action to respond to the loss of this data.”
In the update Thursday, another NSA official said the data were
deleted during a broad, housecleaning effort aimed at making space
for incoming information.
The NSA’s review to date reveals that this [Presidential Surveillance
Program] Internet content data was not specifically targeted for
deletion,” wrote the official, identified as “Dr. Mark O,” “but rather the
PSP Internet content data matched criteria that were broadly used to
delete data of a certain type…in response to mission requirements to
free-up space and improve performance of the [redacted] back-up
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system. The NSA is still investigating how these deletions came about
given the preservation obligations extant at the time. The NSA,
however, has no reason to believe at this time that PSP Internet
content data was specifically targeted for deletion.294
What Does the IC mean by “Transparency”?
Finally, though, a fundamental question is what the IC means by
“transparency” and the reasons for their engaging in it. In his Introduction to
the 3rd Annual SIGINT Progress Report, and his final missive as DNI, James
Clapper wrote:
I issued the Principles of Intelligence Transparency two years ago, and
believe more strongly than ever that responsible transparency is
becoming increasingly inseparable from public trust, and consequently,
from mission success. We cannot accomplish our mission without
public trust, and to earn and retain that trust, we must better explain
both our role in protecting national security, and the rules and
oversight framework that governs our activities. This includes
engaging with the public to enhance their understanding of the IC—
including meeting with civil society representatives to hear their
concerns and better explain our perspectives. Of course, we must
continue to carry out our obligation to protect intelligence sources,
methods, and activities when disclosure would harm national security.
Transparency is difficult, but also, in my view, essential.295
Belief in Accountability or Public Relations?
I asked above if the second of the two epigraphs (included at the start
of this article) reflect a true change of heart and mind by Bob Litt, or is the
first one the truth and the second one public relations? My suspicions are
toward the latter. Every public-facing statement I have found from the
intelligence agencies’ leadership post-Snowden often uses exactly the same
words and phrases.296 Each also contextualizes the transparency
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commitment, as does DNI Clapper’s statement above, with a limitation (an
implied or stated “but of course”) - an obligation to protect intelligence
sources, methods, and activities. This is facially unobjectionable, but there is
no legal definition of “methods,” so it is an open door to withholding
information.297
The framing here, as in the second Bob Litt quote at the start of this
paper, is that public trust is essential to mission success - not a value in
itself. Transparency is protective, not a commitment to the public or to
accountable government.
Keeping the Bubble of Secrecy Pierced
The reality is, of course, that the information is in the hands of the
intelligence agencies that have understood their mission, as one individual
put it, to be collecting information and keeping it secret, not sharing it. From
the perspective of the public, and its representatives, however, “we don’t
know what we don’t know.” As James Madison famously said,
A popular Government, without popular information, or the means of
acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or, perhaps
both. Knowledge will forever govern ignorance: And a people who
mean to be their own Governors, must arm themselves with the power
which knowledge gives.298

Public Responsibility
Our charge as the American public is to figure out how to wrest
knowledge from the hands of our government. Our difficulty is identifying
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how we can make Madison’s cautionary advice real. It is, without doubt, an
uphill and ongoing struggle, but the public is not on its own.
As has been amply demonstrated throughout this article (and in the
endnotes), the press is a powerful ally in ferreting out lies and engaging in
investigative truth-telling. Especially now, they need our financial as well as
our rhetorical and moral support.
Members of the press are not alone in calling out illegal, abusive,
and/or fraudulent government practices. Often, their information comes
from individuals inside the government, sometimes - but not often information the agency has properly classified.299 Not everyone who works
for the federal government has equivalent whistleblower protection,
however; IC employees do, and IC contract employees now have some.300
Indeed, a recent Senate Intelligence Committee report on the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 stated:
The Committee remains concerned about the level of protection
afforded to whistleblowers within the IC and the level of insight
congressional committees have into their disclosures. It is the
Committee's expectation that all Offices of Inspector General across
the IC will fully cooperate with the direction provided elsewhere in the
bill to ensure both the Director of National Intelligence and the
congressional committees have more complete awareness of the
disclosures made to any IG about any National Intelligence Program
funded activity.301
As noted above, the Section 702 Reauthorization, Section 110,
extends some whistleblower protections to IC contractor employees, who are
about one-fourth of the greater IC workforce.302 Under Section 110, contract
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employees are now protected to report wrongdoing, but enforcement
mechanisms against retaliation are lacking in the bill itself: “The President
shall provide for the enforcement of this subsection.”

A Troubling Development
In a troubling, and at this writing still unresolved, development, the IC
whistleblower ombudsman, Dan Meyer, was barred in October 2017 from
communicating with whistleblowers, which is the main responsibility of his
job as the Executive Director for Intelligence Community Whistleblowing and
Source protection. The four-year-old program of outreach and training on
proper disclosure and whistleblower protections for employees working with
classified material is endangered. According to Foreign Policy:
The intelligence community’s central watchdog is in danger of
crumbling thanks to mismanagement, bureaucratic battles, clashes
among big personalities, and sidelining of whistleblower outreach and
training efforts, sources told FP. A strong whistleblowing outlet is
needed as an alternative to leaking, and to protect employees from
retaliation for reporting misconduct, proponents of the office argue.
But many intelligence officials see outreach to their employees as an
attempt to cultivate leakers or outside interference, rather than a
secure, proper way to report potential violations of law.303
The culture depicted here guarantees there will continue to be a need
for organizations that vet the claims made by whistleblowers who are
blocked and retaliated against internally, and work with them to get the
identified problems appropriately addressed.304
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Conclusion
As members of the public, we each have the responsibility to hold our
Senators’ and our Representative’s respective feet to the fire. We have to be
vigilant in meeting with them and in following them in the news - and not
just their Twitter or Facebook feeds - to ascertain if they are working to
protect both our First Amendment rights and our Fourth Amendment
protections against the government, for example, “The right of the people to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized.”
This may seem a daunting task - and it is. A place to start is by
looking to the experts who present testimony, send letters to Congress, and
prepare analysis and commentaries.305 Two online publications - Just
Security and Lawfare - among others, provide ongoing coverage of the
issues raised in this article, as do the journalists cited (although they may
well have moved to other venues).306,307 The problems have not gone away,
and they are unlikely to do so in the foreseeable future.308
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